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INTRODUCTION
Every state now collects DNA from people convicted of certain of-
fenses.' Law enforcement authorities promote offender DNA databank-
ing on the theory that it will clear previously unsolved crimes and
identify offenders who commit additional crimes while on probation or
parole, or after they have finished serving their sentences. Even rela-
tively small databases have yielded such dividends.2 As these database
searches uncover the perpetrators of rapes, murders, and other offenses,
the pressure builds to expand the coverage of the databases. 3 As the
databanks grow, so do fears about civil liberties. Editorial writers decry
"unfettered government-sponsored bioinvasion '" 4 and call for legislation
"to ensure that scientific advances in law enforcement do not swamp the
privacy rights of ordinary citizens. '" 5 Professors of law, sociology, and
public health describe DNA databanking as part of an insidious "surveil-
I See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239 (2000). There are many other sources of DNA
samples that law enforcement officials might wish to examine in specific cases. Many sam-
ples are held by hospitals, public health authorities, health maintenance organizations, bi-
omedical researchers, and the military. See, e.g., STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL,
AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Robert A. Weir ed., 1998). Access to the samples in these
non-law-enforcement repositories, for the purpose of criminal investigations or prosecutions, is
discussed in Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001).
2 See D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 224-26 (1997). For example, in St. Paul, Min-
nesota, a man wearing a nylon stocking over his face and armed with a knife jumped out from
behind bushes and assaulted a woman who was walking by. Semen recovered from the vic-
tim's skirt and saliva was analyzed using DNA technology. When the resulting DNA profile
was searched against Minnesota's database, a matching profile led police to the rapist. Ste-
phen J. Niezgoda, CODIS Program Overview, PROCEEDINGS FROM THE EIGHTH INTERNA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION (Promega Corp. ed., 1999). These "cold hits"
can stretch back decades to solve "cold cases" -those that the police had given up on. See,
e.g., C.J. Chivers, DNA Match Implicates Inmate in '79 Murder, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2000, at B I.
3 Most states currently collect samples only from people who are convicted of sex
crimes and a few other violent offenses - about eight percent of felons each year. Robbers,
kidnappers, burglars and those convicted of attempted crimes usually are not included. Rich-
ard Perez-Pena & Jayson Blair, N. Y. State to Develop Database on Felons' DNA as Investiga-
tive Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1999, at Al. But the coverage will grow. New York, for
example, adopted a law that will apply to about half the defendants convicted of felonies. The
crimes that will put DNA information into the database include murder, manslaughter, assault,
sex crimes, drug dealing, robbery, burglary, grand larceny, and the most serious categories of
drug possession, attempted murder, arson, kidnapping and attempted burglary. Exempted
would be most drug possession crimes, as well as child abuse and drunken driving. Id. Eight
states - Alabama, Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and
Wyoming - already cast their nets even more widely. Id.
4 Paul R. Billings, Op-Ed, DNA Data Banks Would Taint Justice, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
14, 1999, at A19, available at 1999 WL 6043488.
5 Editorial, DNA, Crime-fighting and the Right to Privacy, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, July 12, 1999, at A6, available at 1999 WL 8138762.
2001] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA SAMPLING ON ARREST 457
lance creep ' 6 and "the first step toward an Orwellian society"7 that will
make "us a 'nation of suspects,' and radically alters the relationship be-
tween the citizen and the government."8
Recent proposals call for extending not merely the scope of crimes
for which DNA databanking would be used, but also the point at which
the samples would be collected. The United Kingdom and most Euro-
pean countries already collect and store DNA from all persons arrested
for a wide range of offenses.9 More than one state in this country has
enacted legislation enabling DNA sampling upon arrest. 10 In other
states, legislators have introduced bills that would authorize or require
6 Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, DNA Identification and Surveillance Creep, 29 So-
CIOLOGY OF ILLNESS & HEALTH 689 (1999).
7 Jean E. McEwen, Sherlock Holmes Meets Genetic Fingerprinting, BOSTON COLL. L.
SCH. MAO., Spring 1994, at 44.
8 George Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded 'Future Dia-
ries,' 270 JAMA 2346 (1993) (speaking of an highly inclusive databank); Jean E. McEwen,
DNA Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC AGE 231, 236 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997) ("[A] population-wide DNA data bank
could fundamentally alter the relationship between individuals and the state, essentially turning
us into a nation of suspects."); Jonathan Kimmelman, The Promise and Perils of Criminal
DNA Databanking, 18 NATURE BIOTECH. 695, 696 (2000) ("Storing information on otherwise
unsuspected individuals .. .expresses an ethos of suspicion."). These pronouncements are
relatively mild. Both advocacy organizations and respected academics portray the laws of
some states as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Nuremberg Code for medical
experimentation. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 4, at A19; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Institute for
Science, Law and Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology [lIT Brief], Landry v. Harsh-
barger, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999), at 4, 30 (implying that the STR loci used in law
enforcement databanking contain disease-related information and complaining that release of
anonymized samples without the consent of prisoners violates the Nuremberg Code). For criti-
cism of these claims, see D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench and Bar: Selected Arguments in Landry
v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000).
9 Address by David Werrett, 18th International Congress on Forensic Haemogenetics,
San Francisco, Aug. 19, 1999. In the United Kingdom, the records and samples were de-
stroyed if a conviction did not ensue, id., but the Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16
(Eng.), now provides for indefinite retention.
10 See 15 LA REV. STAT. § 609(A) (1998) ("A person who is arrested for a felony sex
offense or other specified offense on or after September 1, 1999, shall have a DNA sample
drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure.").
Despite the language of the statute, it is reported that the state will delay implementing the
requirement for lack of funding and testing facilities. See Guy Gugliotta, A Rush to DNA
Sampling; Vital Police Tool? Affront to Liberty? Both?, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at Al,
available at 1999 WL 17012783.
Another state has abandoned the experiment. A South Dakota statute provided that "[t]he
Attorney General shall procure and file for record genetic marker grouping analysis informa-
tion from any person taken into custody for a violation of the provisions of chapter 22-22."
However, in 1997 the law was amended to restrict the collection of samples from convicted
offenders. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-14 (Supp. 1999).
A few states have authorized taking DNA after indictment. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 207(b)(3) ("For the purposes of this subdivision, 'a suspect' means a person against whom
an information or indictment has been filed for one of the crimes listed in subdivision (a) of
Section 296. For the purposes of this subdivision, a person shall remain a suspect for two years
from the date of the filing of the information or indictment or until the DNA laboratory re-
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DNA databanking for arrestees. 11 Calls for DNA sampling upon arrest
from the police commissioner and mayor of New York City, 12 have
sparked public rallies at City Hall' 3 and cries of "unconstitutional!" from
the American Civil Liberties Union. 14 Although the backlog of existing
DNA samples from convicted offenders awaiting analysis makes these
proposals unappealing, 15 the situation will change as more resources are
ceives notification that the person has been acquitted of the charges or the charges were
dismissed.").
Local authorities also might begin to collect samples on arrest without waiting for state
legislation or additional funding. In August, 1999, Salt Lake County Sheriff Aaron Kennard
announced his office's intention to sample all arrestees' DNA and to seek federal funds for an
expansion of forensic laboratory capacity to match the increase in demand for DNA analysis
that would ensue. See Jennifer Dobner, DNA Test Sought on All Booked at New Jail, DESERET
NEWS, Aug. 4, 1999, at Al.
I I A bill introduced early in 1999, in the Connecticut General Assembly would require
the collection of DNA from those arrested of any criminal offense. The bill does not require
destruction of the sample unless the arrestee is not later "convicted of an offense." 1999 Ct.
S.B. 315 (introduced Jan. 15, 1999). A bill introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly
would require that DNA samples be taken from all individuals arrested for felonies. N.C.
Senate Bill 165 (introduced Feb. 23, 1999). It would allow individuals to petition for expunge-
ment of a "DNA record or profile" after "the felony arrest or conviction ... has been reversed
and the case dismissed." Id. § 15A-266.10(a). New York Senate Bill 1795, introduced January
30, 2001, would require individuals arrested for a variety of felonies to provide a sample of
blood for DNA testing; cf N.Y. Assembly Bill 4486 § 2, introduced February 12, 2001 (pro-
viding that the executive branch develop "a statewide strategic plan for requiring any person
arrested for an offense for which the fingerprints of the person are required to be taken ... also
be required to provide at the time of arrest, a sample appropriate for DNA testing to determine
identification characteristics specific to such person for inclusion in the state DNA identifica-
tion index").
12 In December 1998, New York Police Commissioner Howard Safir and Mayor Ru-
dolph Giuliani called on the New York legislature to consider expanding the New York state
databanking law to allow DNA collection from every person arrested. See John Kifner, Safir
Says DNA Proposal Would Cut Property Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, § 1, at 51. The
International Association of Police Chiefs soon endorsed the concept. See Jayson Blair, Police
Chiefs Join in Call for More DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at B5. The Republi-
can candidate has made it part of his campaign for Attorney General of Virginia. See Lau-
rence Hammack, Kilgore Wants to Expand DNA Databases to Suspects, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001, at Al.
13 See Susan Sachs, Advocates Joining Forces to Fight Pataki DNA Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1999, § 1, at 21.
14 See Kifner, supra note 12 ("Norman Siegel, director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union, said he would oppose the plan as violating the Constitution's Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure."); Nat'l Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evi-
dence, Proceedings, Mar. 1, 1999 (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director,
American Civil Liberties Union), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlnij/dnamtgtrans4/trans_l.html
(visited Sept. 13, 1999) (contending that taking DNA from arrestees cannot be justified under
the Fourth Amendment); cf Editorial, DNA Testing Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at
A32 ("a threat to personal privacy that is unnecessary for fighting crime").
15 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF DNA
CRIME LABORATORIES 1998 (Feb. 2000) (reporting that as of the end of 1997, 69% of DNA
labs had a backlog of 6,800 known and unknown subject cases and 287,000 convicted offender
samples); Guy Gugliotta, A Rush to DNA Sampling; Vital Police Tool? Affront to Liberty?
Both?, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A01, available at 1999 WL 17012783 (reporting "esti-
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applied to reduce the backlog 16 and the technology for analyzing the
samples advances. 17 At that point, the constitutional questions will spill
out of the editorial pages and into legislative chambers and courthouses
throughout the country.
This article examines the constitutionality of taking, analyzing, and
storing DNA samples and data from individuals who are arrested. 18 The
mates that 500,000 samples taken during the last four years are awaiting analysis and that an
additional 1 million to 1.5 million offenders qualify for testing that has not been done").
16 See Assoc. Press, State Police Move to Ease Backlog at Crime Labs by 2003, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, July 20, 2001, at BI (reporting on plans in Illinois); Naftali Bendavid,
U.S. Targets DNA Backlog: Agency to Spend $30 Million to Aid State Crime Labs, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 2, 2001, at 10; Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 16 (reporting that to alleviate case
backlogs 44% of the laboratories had hired additional staff, 34% were using overtime, 13%
were contracting with private labs, and 28% were using other methods); Maxine Bernstein,
DNA Crime Lab Scores "Cold Hits," PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 17, 2001, at A01, available
at 2001 WL 3595398 (reporting that with federal assistance, Oregon's state laboratory has
nearly eliminated its backlog).
17 For examples of emerging technologies that may permit rapid analysis of large num-
bers of DNA samples, see J.A. Monforte & C.H. Becker, High-throughput DNA Analysis by
Time-of-flight Mass Spectrometry, 3 NATURE MEDICINE 360 (1997); D.G. Wang et al., Large-
scale Identification, Mapping, and Genotyping of Single-nucleotide Polymorphisms in the
Human Genome, 280 SCIENCE 1077 (1998) (hybridization chip). Indeed, the prospect of porta-
ble devices for squad cars that would determine and transmit a record of identifying DNA
types using "chips" that perform capillary electrophoresis is no longer science fiction. Cf.
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND ADVANCES IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SERIES: NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONS TECH-
NOLOGY CENTER BULLETIN, Mar. 1998, available at http://www.nlectc.org/txtfiles/12575_5.
html (visited Sept. 14, 1999):
NIJ is funding Lockheed Martin Energy Research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
... to develop another type of disposable microchip device capable of carrying out
all sample processing and analytical steps. Blood or other biological samples could
be collected directly into the device, which could then be sealed for transport and
analysis, eliminating post-collection handling and exposure of samples. Ultimately,
such miniature devices could be used for DNA testing at the crime scene.
See also Kevin Flynn, Fighting Crime with Ingenuity, 007 Style: Gee-Whiz Police Gadgets Get
a Trial Run in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at BI.
18 For a thoughtful, early discussion of offender databases, see Dan L. Burk & Jennifer
A. Hess, Genetic Privacy: Constitutional Considerations in Forensic DNA Testing, 5 GEo.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1 (1994). Additional commentary includes Dan L. Burk, DNA Identi-
fication: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 87 (1992); Jean E. McEwen,
DNA Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC AGE 231, 231 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997); Jean E. McEwen, DNA Sampling and
Banking: Practices and Procedures in the United States, in HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY
407 (Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 1997); Jean E. McEwen, Storing Genes to Solve Crimes:
Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy Considerations, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LE-
GAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 311 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998); Michelle Hibbert,
DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
767 (1999); Eric T. Juengst, I-DNA-fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice, 75 CHI-
CAGO-KENT L. REV. 61 (1999); D.H. Kaye, Bioethical Objections to DNA Databases for Law
Enforcement: Questions and Answers, 31 SETON HALL. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2001); D.H.
Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Databanks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 181
(forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter cited as Two Fallacies]; D.H. Kaye & Michael Smith, DNA
Databases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage Question and the Case for a Population-Wide
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most salient constitutional protections are the Reasonableness and War-
rant Clauses of the Fourth Amendment, the Self-incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 9 The analysis here shows that these protections do not
foreclose a carefully constructed system for compelling individuals sub-
ject to custodial arrest to supply samples of their DNA.
Before undertaking this legal analysis, however, we need a precise
description of what DNA databanking involves. Part I of this article de-
scribes the nature of DNA databanking for law enforcement purposes. It
introduces terminology and distinctions that help clarify the range of pos-
sible systems for collecting and using DNA data. Part II considers the
possibility that forcing individuals to give samples of DNA contravenes
Database, in THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE: THE USE OF DNA IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM (David Lazer ed., forthcoming 2001); Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency:
A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 209 (2000);
Kimmelman, supra note 8; Sheryl H. Love, Allowing New Technology to Erode Constitutional
Protections: A Fourth Amendment Challenge to Non-Consensual DNA Testing of Prisoners,
Jones v. Murray, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1617 (1993); Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal
and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK.
L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2001); Barry Scheck, DNA Data Banking: A Cautionary Tale, 54
AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 931 (1993); E. Donald Shapiro & Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data
Banking: The Dangerous Erosion of Privacy, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455 (1990); J. Clay Smith,
Jr., The Precarious Implications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 865 (1994); Deborah F.
Barfield, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting Justifying the Special Need for the Fourth Amend-
ment's Intrusion into the Zone of Privacy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 27 (2000); Andrea de Gorgey,
Note, The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for Individual Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. &
MED. 109 (1988); C. Teddy Li, Note, Boling v. Romer: Federal Courts Condone Forced
Withdrawal of Blood for DNA Data Banks Despite Constitutional Concerns, I J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POLICY 421 (1998); Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of
Privacy Protection in DNA Databanks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185 (1996); Robert W. Schu-
macher, Note, Expanding New York's DNA Database: The Future of Law Enforcement, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1635 (1999); Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the
Scope of DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921 (2001); Warren R. Webster, Jr.,
Note, DNA Database Statutes and Privacy in the Information Age, 10 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-
MED. 119 (2000); Yale H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law En-
forcement or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461 (1995); cf Teresa K.
Baumann, Note, Proxy Consent and a National DNA Databank: An Unethical and Discrimina-
tory Combination, 86 IOWA L. REV. 667 (2001); Jennifer Sue Deck, Note, Prelude to a Miss: A
Cautionary Note Against Expanding DNA Databanks in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 20
VT. L. REV. 1057 (1996) (arguing that a universal database of DNA samples taken at birth
would be constitutional but inadvisable); Rebecca Sasser Peterson, Note, DNA Databases:
When Fear Goes Too Far, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219 (2000) (asserting that a universal
database would upset the "delicate balance" between citizen and state); Robert Craig Scherer,
Note, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for a New Post-
Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L.J. 2007, 2011 (1997).
19 Some state constitutions contain other provisions that may be applicable, and some
states interpret their constitutions differently than the Supreme Court interprets the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260,
1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an employer's genetic testing program under the right to
privacy found in Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution as well as the U.S. Consti-
tution). This article is confined to an analysis of the federal constitution.
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the Self-incrimination Clause. It explains why even compulsory DNA
sampling does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Part
III examines the Due Process Clause. It shows that neither the process of
collecting DNA nor the storage of it (or the information encoded in it)
necessarily deprives individuals of liberty without due process of law.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the clauses of the Fourth Amendment pertain-
ing to searches and seizures. It shows that neither the lack of a search
warrant nor the absence of probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed the offense to which DNA profiling would pertain is an insu-
perable obstacle to collecting, analyzing, and storing DNA information
from the arrested individual. It argues, however, that the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" requires any
such system to incorporate stringent controls on the scope of the infor-
mation extracted from the samples and the dissemination of that
information.
I. OF DATABANKS AND DATABASES
To construct a law enforcement database, samples of DNA must be
collected, the samples analyzed, and the resulting data stored so that it
can be accessed efficiently. In the systems now in use, a sample of
blood, saliva, or other tissue or fluid is collected, a portion is taken for
analysis, and some of the remainder is preserved and stored. A minute
portion of the genetic information in the subsample is analyzed. The
analysis generally is limited to thirteen locations, or loci, that yield pat-
terns, or genotypes, that approach the level of unique identification.20
Despite the connotation of "genotype," the DNA sequences at these loci
are not genes; these alleles are non-coding, non-regulatory DNA se-
quences. 2' In themselves, they reveal information that is no more inti-
mate than the particular blood serum enzyme that an individual happens
to have, the pattern of blood vessels in the retina of the eye, or the whorls
20 The loci are STRs - short tandem repeats. Usually, there are between seven and
fifteen STR alleles per locus. Thirteen loci that each have ten STR alleles give rise to 55,3 =
4.2 x 1022 (42 billion, trillion) possible genotypes. See David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh,
Reference Guide to Forensic DNA Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIc EvIDENCE
495 n.40 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000). The thirteen loci that the FBI has selected
for databanking yield an "average match probability [ofl one in 180 trillion." Nat'l Comm'n
on the Future of DNA Evidence, Proceedings, May 7, 1999 (statement of James Crow), availa-
ble at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dnamtgtrans5/trans-h.html (visited Sept. 14, 1999).
21 See Kaye, Two Fallacies, supra note 18. A DNA "allele" is a measurable variation
(from person to person) in the structure of the DNA at a given locus. Thus, the collection of
the alleles at the 13 STR loci is the person's "genotype." Forensic scientists often refer to such
DNA genotypes with the nontechnical term "profiles."
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and ridges in a fingerprint. They disclose nothing about the individual's
susceptibility to diseases, bodily structure, or mental functioning.22
These genotypes, expressed as a set of numbers, are entered into
state or local databases. 23 From the state level,24 they can be entered into
a national database known as NDIS - the National DNA Index System
- maintained by the FBI.25 Police looking for the person who might
have left blood, semen, or other biological trace evidence at crime scenes
or on victims 26 can search individual state databases or the national
database to learn whether a known offender might be the source of the
crime-scene DNA. The multilevel system of local, state, and national
databases constitutes CODIS - the Combined DNA Index System.2 7
In short, there are the databases that contain the numerically coded,
identifying genotypes, and databanks that simply store the original sam-
ples taken from offenders. 28 All the genotypes from the databank sam-
ples that comprise the database can be searched by computer to
determine whether any match the genotypes from the trace evidence
samples associated with the crime or the victim. If a match is found,
further police work is required to establish a case against the suspect. If
the full investigation suggests guilt and the case goes to trial, the prose-
22 See id. Contra Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 18; Shapiro & Weinberg, supra
note 18, at 470 (asserting that this "is not scientifically possible"). Some states expressly
prohibit the use of more informative loci. E.g., 20 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1937(b) (1998) ("Analy-
sis ... is not authorized for identification of any medical or genetic disorder.").
23 Typically, the Local DNA Index System (LDIS), is installed at crime laboratories
operated by police departments or sheriffs offices. FBI, What's the Difference Between NDIS
and CODIS?, Oct. 8, 1998, at http://hope-dna.condocs/differencecodis.htm (visited Apr. 29,
1999).
24 Each state participating in the national program may have a single State DNA Index
System (SDIS) that pools data from laboratories within the state and that is the pathway to the
national system. Id.
25 The FBI began implementing NDIS in October 1998, by combining the eight state
DNA offender databanks in California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon,
Utah and Virginia. See Nicholas Wade, F.B.I. Set to Open Its DNA Database for Fighting
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at Al. In addition to the "convicted offender index," NDIS
contains a "forensic index" of crime scene profiles permitting case-to-case matches (see supra
note 20), an "unidentified persons index," a "victims index," and a population database of
anonymous DNA genotypes that can be used to estimate the probability that a DNA sample
picked at random from the population would match a crime scene sample. Stephen J.
Niezgoda & Barry Brown, The FBI Laboratory's Combined DNA Index System Program, in
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION 1995
149-52 (Promega Corp. ed., 1996).
26 Authorities also use databanks of DNA genotypes of crime scene samples to link
crimes committed by serial offenders. Erin Hallissy & Charlie Goodyear, DNA Links '70s
Rapes to Serial Slaying Cases / Unknown Southern California Killer was "East Area Rapist,"
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 3399810; Niezgoda & Brown, supra
note 25, at 149.
27 FBI, supra note 23.
28 State statutes often observe this distinction. E.g., 20 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1932(10) &
(11) (1998); W. VA. CODE § 15-28-3(e) & (f) (1999).
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cution should not rely on the database search to link the defendant to the
crime. Rather, defendant's genotypes should come from the analysis of a
new confirmatory sample of the suspect's DNA. 29 If this sample
matches the trace evidence DNA, then there is no need to introduce evi-
dence of the database search, which would imply (possibly in violation
of the rules of evidence 30 ) that the defendant has a criminal record.
In these terms, the question that must be answered is whether any
system of DNA databanks or databases is consistent with the protections
the Constitution affords individuals. To answer this question, we must
attend to all phases of the system - collecting DNA samples, analyzing
them, storing them, recording the genotypes in them, and using that bio-
metric information.
II. SELF INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no person
shall "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
.... "31 Despite vigorous dissents, 32 the Supreme Court has held time
and again that the privilege against self-incrimination reaches no farther
than communications that are "testimonial. ' 33 Revealing mere physical
or behavior characteristics is not "testimonial. '34 Thus, the privilege
29 Indeed, Maryland law goes so far as to specify that "[any match obtained between an
evidence sample and a data base entry may only be used as probable cause to obtain a blood
sample from the subject and is not admissible at trial unless confirmed by additional testing."
MD. CODE art. 88B § 12A(l) (1998).
30 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404.
31 U.S. CONST., art. V.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 32-38 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 778 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
33 See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910). In Holt, Mr. Justice Holmes
dismissed as an "extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment" the argument that it violated
the privilege to require a defendant to put on a blouse for identification purposes. He ex-
plained that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." Id. at 252-53.
See also Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653 (Md. 1909) (reasoning that police may photograph and
make bodily measurements to identify an arrestee without infringing the general liberty inter-
est or the privilege against self-incrimination).
More recently, the Court has stated that "to be testimonial, an accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment did not extend to
a consent form waiving a privacy interest in foreign bank records because the consent form
spoke in the hypothetical and did not identify any particular banks, accounts, or private
records; it neither "communicate[d] any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, [n]or con-
vey[ed] any information to the Government." Id. at 215.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (suspects could be compelled
to read a transcript to provide a voice exemplar because the "voice recordings were to be used
solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses' voices, not for the testimonial or
communicative content of what was to be said"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
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does not protect an individual from government compulsion to provide
blood or other biological samples. For example, in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia,35 a man was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for inju-
ries suffered in an accident involving the automobile that he had
apparently been driving. At the direction of a police officer, a physician
at the hospital withdrew a blood sample over the suspect's objection.
Chemical analysis indicated a high blood alcohol level, and the man was
convicted for driving while intoxicated. Although he insisted that the
forced extraction of his blood compelled him to be a witness against
himself, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The majority ex-
plained that:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or
enforced communication by the accused was involved
either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Peti-
tioner's testimonial capacities were in no way impli-
cated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was
irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on
chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test
evidence, although an incriminating product of compul-
sion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence re-
lating to some communicative act or writing by the
petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege
grounds. 36
In light of this doctrine, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
made short shrift of a Fifth Amendment argument against DNA
databanking for convicted offenders. In Boling v. Romer,37 the court
simply stated that the claim that "requiring DNA samples from inmates
amounts to compulsory self-incrimination fails because DNA samples
(a suspect could be compelled to participate in a lineup and to repeat a phrase provided by the
police so that witnesses could view him and listen to his voice); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 266-67 (1967) (a suspect could be compelled to provide a handwriting exemplar because
"in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying
physical characteristic outside [the privilege's] protection").
35 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36 Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
37 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996).
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are not testimonial in nature." 38 The same result follows inescapably
with respect to DNA samples from arrestees. 39
III. DUE PROCESS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no person "shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... "40 This Due Process Clause requires that the government adopt fair
procedures before invading personal liberty or property interests, and
that, at a minimum, the invasion rationally can be said to advance some
legitimate governmental purpose. DNA databanking, it can be argued,
implicates two aspects of personal liberty - bodily integrity and the
privacy of personal information. We consider each in turn.
A. BODILY INTEGRITY
Although the removal of a person's cells plainly infringes a liberty
interest in bodily integrity, 41 it is well settled that the safe and relatively
painless removal of blood does not offend due process. 42 In Breithaupt
38 See also United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 573-74 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dictum). A
contrary view is expressed in Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreli-
able Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990), which
claims that "the unique autobiographical nature" of DNA identification evidence should place
it the category of testimonial evidence." Id. at 533. For criticism of this view, see Burk &
Hess, supra note 18, at 18 (concluding that "there is no reason to believe that DNA evidence
will be or should be treated any differently than any other type of physical evidence").
39 In addition, even if the extraction of biological material somehow could be construed
as testimonial, the implications of the privilege against self-incrimination are not entirely clear.
Under Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), it appears that arrestees might not need to
be advised that the privilege entitles them to decline to give a DNA sample. In Muniz, a
plurality opinion for four Justices written by Justice Brennan reasoned that "questions regard-
ing [a suspect's] name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age ... fall
within a 'routine booking question' exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage ques-
tions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" Id.
at 601 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Another four Justices, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took the position that the questions "were not testimonial
and do not warrant application of the privilege," making "it . . . unnecessary to determine
whether the questions fall within the 'routine booking question' exception to Miranda Justice
Brennan recognizes." Id. at 608. Only Justice Marshall took issue with the proposed "routine
booking exception" to the application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Id. at
608-09.
40 U.S. CONST., art. V, XIV.
41 Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (stating
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.").
42 ld. at 172. Indeed, it is questionable whether today's Court even would apply a due
process analysis. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998) (Souter,
J., noting that "Rochin, of course, was decided long before Graham v. Connor (and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), and today would be treated under the Fourth Amendment, albeit
with the same result."). In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), to which Justice Souter
refers, police broke into a suspect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put
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v. Abram,43 for instance, a pickup truck collided with a car in New Mex-
ico. Three occupants of the car were killed, and the driver of the truck
was seriously injured. A pint whiskey bottle, almost empty, was found
in the glove compartment of the pickup truck. The driver was taken to a
hospital, where he lay unconscious in the emergency room with the smell
of liquor on his breath. A state patrolman asked an attending physician
to take a blood sample. Laboratory analysis showed this blood to contain
about .17% alcohol, and this blood alcohol evidence was used to convict
the driver of involuntary manslaughter. The driver later challenged his
imprisonment on the ground that the conduct of the police in seizing the
blood from his unconscious body was so offensive as to deprive him of
due process of law.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, weighing the severity of
the infringement on personal liberty against the public interest in
preventing automobile accidents and in adjudicating complaints for
drunken driving accurately. The majority first observed that "certainly
the test as administered here would not be considered offensive by even
the most delicate."'44 The Court then concluded that "so slight an intru-
sion" of "the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable"
could not prevail as against "the interests of society in the scientific de-
termination of intoxication, one of the great causes of the mortal hazards
of the road. And the more so since the test likewise may establish inno-
cence, thus affording protection against the treachery of judgment based
on one or more of the senses."' 45
into his mouth, took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be administered to induce
vomiting. This course of conduct, the Court wrote, "shocks the conscience" in that:
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this
course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation.
43 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
44 Id. at 436. The Court added that:
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the
sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of
"decency and fairness" that has been woven by common experience into the fabric
of acceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock that this Court has established the con-
cept of due process. The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday
life. It is a ritual for those going into the military service as well as those applying
for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance
and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer,
routine in becoming blood donors. Likewise, we note that a majority of our States
have either enacted statutes in some form authorizing tests of this nature or permit
findings so obtained to be admitted in evidence. We therefore conclude that a blood
test taken by a skilled technician is not such "conduct that shocks the conscience,"
nor such a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a "sense of justice."
See id. at 436-37 (citations and footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 439.
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Much the same analysis has been applied to uphold taking DNA
samples from prison inmates. In Kruger v. Erickson,46 the District Court
for the District of Minnesota observed that "the procedures ... are per-
formed" by "trained laboratory technician[s]" "according to medically
acceptable protocols. '47 The court therefore held that the extraction of
an inmate's blood for DNA databanking "does not 'shock the con-
science,' or 'offend the sense of justice.'"48
Removing cells for DNA profiling from arrestees might not involve
a physician as in Breithaupt, or even a technician as in Kruger. DNA
can be extracted from many sources, including not just white blood cells,
but also buccal cells lining the cheek, saliva, and probably skin scrap-
ings. 49 A police officer might be trained to take a buccal swab, to collect
a saliva sample, or to remove epidermal cells with a sticky pad. Because
such procedures are even less intrusive and less dangerous than removing
blood with a hypodermic needle - the procedure employed in
Breithaupt - the use of trained non-medical personnel is not so shock-
ing or offensive as to violate the Due Process Clause.
B. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
Freedom from bodily intrusion is one species of "privacy" that the
Due Process Clause surely protects. A distinct strand of privacy is the
right to keep highly personal information confidential. 50 At the outset,
however, it is not clear that the "liberty" or "property" that the clause
protects includes such a right to informational privacy. Moreover, even
if this form of privacy is a "liberty" or "property" interest, a system of
DNA databanking that includes reasonable safeguards for preventing im-
proper disclosure of the information satisfies the Due Process Clause.
These conclusions follow from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Whalen v. Roe.5 1 New York adopted a law requiring physicians to file
copies of prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs with the state Depart-
ment of Health. The information, including the name and address of the
patient, was entered into a computerized data base. The forms them-
selves were stored in a vault and destroyed after five years. Access to
46 875 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1995).
47 Id. at 587.
48 Id.
49 Indeed, one company markets a product, designed to be used by police, life insurance
agents, and others, that collects oral fluid containing DNA. See http://www.pmewswire.coml
cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=105&STORY=/www/story/l_9_98/391342 (visited Sept. 13, 1999).
50 On the types of privacy, see, for example, Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging
Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN
THE GENETIC ERA 31 (1997). Professor Lawrence Gostin provides a useful summary of the
literature on theories of privacy, particularly as they pertain to medical information, in Law-
rence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451 (1995).
51 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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the data was restricted, and public disclosure of the identity of patients
was prohibited by the statute and by a Department of Health regulation. 52
Twenty months after the effective date of the Act, the computerized data
had only been used in two investigations involving alleged overuse of
drugs by specific patients.
A group of patients and physicians challenged the constitutionality
of the statute. A three-judge district court held that "the doctor-patient
relationship intrudes on one of the zones of privacy accorded constitu-
tional protection" and that the patient-identification provisions of the Act
invaded this privacy with "a needlessly broad sweep." 5 3 It enjoined en-
forcement of the provisions of the Act that dealt with the reporting of
patients' names and addresses.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice Stevens' opinion
for the Court first observed that the New York law was "the product of
an orderly and rational legislative decision," 54 that "could reasonably be
expected to have a deterrent effect on potential violators as well as to aid
in the detection or investigation of specific instances of apparent
abuse."155 Therefore, even though the number of instances in which the
data base was used was small, "the patient-identification requirement
was a reasonable exercise of New York's broad police powers."'56
This portion of the opinion applies the traditional "rational basis"
test. Under this standard, the Court will not invalidate legislation under
the Due Process Clause merely because it is unwise or apparently unnec-
essary; rather, there must be no rational basis for concluding that the law
furthers a legitimate government interest. A much more demanding stan-
dard applies to legislation that infringes fundamental rights such as free-
dom of expression or procreative liberty. An invasion of such a right
requires the state to show a compelling interest rather than mere
rationality. 57
That the Whalen Court chose to apply the rational basis test thus
suggests that it did not see the statute as implicating a constitutional right
to privacy. Indeed, Part II of' the'Court's opinion explicitly rejects the
argument that the record-keeping system invaded a protected "zone of
privacy. '58 Plaintiffs maintained that the system infringed two distinct
52 Willful violation of these prohibitions was punishable by up to one year in prison and
a $2,000 fine.
53 Id. at 596.
54 Id. at 597.
55 Id. at 598.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.").
58 429 U.S. at 598.
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privacy interests - one "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and
another "in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions."' 59 The Court implicitly assumed that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects these interests, but it did little to confirm or deny this premise.
Instead, it merely concluded that "neither the immediate nor the
threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New
York ... Act... on either the reputation or the independence of patients
for whom Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to con-
stitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'60 Indeed, in the concluding portion of its opinion, the
Court stated that it had "not decided" whether "unwarranted disclosure"
of "personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files" might violate the Constitution.
6 1
In contrast to the Court's opinion, the concurring opinions squarely
address whether a constitutional right to privacy necessitated more de-
manding review. Justice Brennan agreed that "limited reporting require-
ments in the medical field are familiar ... and are not generally regarded
as an invasion of privacy."'62 He suggested, however, that "[biroad dis-
semination by state officials of such information ... would clearly impli-
cate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be
justified only by compelling state interests. ' 63 Furthermore, he worried
that "[t]he central storage and easy'accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and [was] not
59 Id. at 599-600.
60 Id. at 603-04. Whalen rejected the Fourth Amendment as the basis for either of these
rights. See id. at 604 n.32 ("The Roe appellees also claim that a constitutional privacy right
emanates from the Fourth Amendment, citing language in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, at a
point where it quotes from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. But those cases involve affirm-
ative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of
criminal investigations. We have never carried the Fourth Amendment's interest in privacy as
far as the Roe appellees would have us. We decline to do so now.").
61 Id. at 605:
A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in com-
puterized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the
distribution of welfare and'social security benefits, tle sulervision of public health,
the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all
require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right
to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a con-
comitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing
that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, never-
theless New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative proce-
dures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in
privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure.
62 Id. at 606.
63 Id.
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prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the neces-
sity of some curb on such technology. ' 64 Nevertheless, he concluded
that strict scrutiny was not required unless and until there was some
showing that the system would result of unauthorized dissemination. 65
Justice Stewart sharply disputed Justice Brennan's claim that broad dis-
semination "would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy
rights." His concurring opinion demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
never recognized such a privacy right.66
Whalen does not reveal whether government collection of personal
DNA information implicates a privacy right that is an aspect of the lib-
erty protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, the
case deals with the acquisition and storage of privately generated medical
data. There are intimations that the state is constitutionally required to
maintain the confidentiality of this information, but even this is unclear.
Nevertheless, some lower courts have recognized a privacy right to
nondisclosure of stigmatizing personal information. For example, in In
re Doe,67 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New
York City's Commission on Human Rights may have violated the right
to privacy by issuing a press release that identified the plaintiff as HIV
seropositive.68 In Powell v. Schriver,69 the same court extended Doe to
brand the gratuitous disclosure to prison inmates that a prisoner was an
HIV positive transsexual as an invasion of the prisoner's right to privacy
and to allow recovery of damages under the civil rights laws. In Nor-
man-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,70 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals extended Doe and related cases to medical tests for
pregnancy, syphilis, and the allele for sickle cell anemia. 71
64 Id. at 607.
65 "In this case, as the Court's opinion makes clear, the State's carefully designed pro-
gram includes numerous safeguards intended to forestall the danger of indiscriminate disclo-
sure. Given this serious and, so far as the record shows, successful effort to prevent abuse and
limit access to the personal information at issue, I cannot say that the statute's provisions for
computer storage, on their face, amount to a deprivation of constitutionally protected privacy
interests, any more than the more traditional reporting provisions." Id.
66 Id. at 607.
67 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
68 Plaintiff had entered into a conciliation agreement under which Delta Airlines hired
him as a customer services agent. Notwithstanding the Whalen Court's explicit disclaimer of
any decision regarding the constitutional basis of a right to nondisclosure of medical informa-
tion, the Second Circuit wrote that Whalen "recognized" such a right. 15 F.3d at 267. Depart-
ing from Justice Brennan's view that the right to nondisclosure could be overcome only by a
compelling state interest, the Court of Appeals remanded for further findings under an interme-
diate level of constitutional scrutiny that required only a substantial state interest to overcome
the privacy right.
69 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
70 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
71 Administrative and clerical employees at a national laboratory operated by state and
federal authorities alleged that the laboratory tested their blood and urine for these conditions
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These cases rest on a remarkably generous reading of Whalen,72 and
other courts have expressed "grave doubts" about the existence of a con-
stitutional right to nondisclosure of "personal" information. 73 Neverthe-
less, assuming arguendo that Doe, Powell, and Norman-Bloodsaw are
correctly decided, they do not invalidate arrestee DNA databanking. The
purely identifying features of DNA are not in the same stigmatizing cate-
gory as having tested positive for HIV or syphilis, having undergone a
sex change operation, having used narcotics, or being pregnant. And,
even if DNA data were the type of information to which the privacy right
attaches, the unmistakable lesson of Whalen v. Roe is that collecting and
storing the information do not infringe the right to privacy as long as the
government provides effective safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of
the DNA samples and data.74
without their knowledge or consent. This testing, they contended, violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and their right to pri-
vacy as guaranteed by the constitutions of California and the United States. The district court
granted the defendants' motions for dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judg-
ment on all these claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the ADA claims, but reversed as to
the Title VII and state and federal privacy claims. The court of appeals recognized that cases
like Doe, "defining the privacy interest in medical information[,] have typically involved its
disclosure to 'third' parties, rather than the collection of information by illicit means," but
thought "it goes without saying that the most basic violation possible involves the performance
of unauthorized tests - that is, the non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed medical
information that may be unknown even to plaintiffs." Id. at 1269. Having discerned a liberty
right under the Due Process Clause, however, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to analyze that right
solely in Fourth Amendment terms, balancing the government's interest in collecting the infor-
mation against the nature of the invasion of privacy. Id. The court reasoned that while the
government had no legitimate interest in conducting the tests as alleged, the invasion was
profound because it involved especially sensitive information about the health or genetic status
of the employees. Id. at 1269-70.
72 See supra note 51. Another case sometimes cited in this context is Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). E.g., Burk & Hess, supra note 18, at 34-35.
Nixon recognizes that government inspection of family and financial records implicates an
interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause.
73 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
118 F.3d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reViewing and analyzing the division among the circuits);
Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that no constitutionally protected
privacy interest exists in medical records). The Fourth Circuit avoided the question in Fergu-
son v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (2001), when it
upheld a policy instituted by the Medical University of South Carolina under which urine
samples from maternity patients suspected of using cocaine were tested for cocaine and pa-
tients who tested positive were given a choice between being arrested and receiving drug
counseling. The court of appeals reasoned that the arguable due process right yielded to the
state's interest in protecting the fetus. On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court did not
consider whether the collection of the information about the urine sample or the transmission
of that information from the hospital to the police implicates a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause. Instead, it limited its analysis to the "special needs" exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part IV.B.3.
74 This qualification snould not be overlooked. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Objections grounded in the Fourth Amendment are not so easily
surmounted. That Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, compulsory DNA sampling upon arrest would violate this right if
(1) it constitutes a "search or seizure" that (2) is "unreasonable." The
DNA data gathering system would be unreasonable (a) if the police lack
a judicial warrant to take DNA, and a warrant is essential; (b) they lack
adequate information to believe that the DNA will help to prove that the
suspect is guilty of the crime for which the arrest is made, and such
information is necessary; or (c) the system of collecting or using the sam-
ples unjustifiably invades personal privacy in other ways.
This section suggests that the threshold question of whether there is
a search should be answered in the affirmative but that a carefully de-
signed and very limited system of arrestee databanking should be
deemed reasonable under the balancing test that the Supreme Court has
applied to Fourth Amendment claims in recent years. Part A considers
whether collecting DNA on arrest is a search. Part B discusses the stan-
dards or tests that might be used to determine reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment and how these apply to DNA databanking.
A. DNA SAMPLING AS A SEARCH OR SEIZURE
A threshold question in considering the constitutionality under the
Fourth Amendment of DNA sampling is whether the acquisition of the
sample is a search or seizure. If DNA sampling is not a search or
seizure, then the Fourth Amendment is no barrier. As shown below,
whether the collection of a biological sample is a search or seizure de-
pends on the method of collection and the disposition of the sample. If
sampling involves a physical intrusion into the body, the procedure is a
search or seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. But if it is merely an
inspection of material on the surface of the body, it is arguable that there
is a search or seizure only if subsequent analysis can reveal sensitive,
personal information. Unless the process for DNA sampling upon arrest
is highly circumscribed, it can reveal such information and therefore
should be treated as a search.
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1. The Katz Standard
A great deal of modem Fourth Amendment law is built on Katz v.
United States.75 In Katz, the government acquired key evidence to con-
vict the defendant of interstate gambling by attaching an electronic lis-
tening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth.
The government argued that the interception was not a search because
there was no physical trespass and the telephone booth was a public
place. The Supreme Court held that neither entry onto private property
nor inspection of tangible items is an essential feature of a search, for
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'76 It protected the
defendant, the Court explained, because "a person in a telephone booth
.. . who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."'77 Because
the federal agents had no warrant authorizing the interception, the major-
ity held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan elaborated on the majority's
remarks. In perhaps the most famous passage in the opinions, he wrote:
"[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ",78 Ap-
plying this standard, he explained that "[t]he point is not that the booth is
'accessible to the public' at other times, but that it is a temporarily pri-
vate place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from
intrusion are recognized as reasonable." '79
Under Katz, the crucial threshold question for DNA sampling is
whether society should recognize as reasonable the expectation that the
sample is not "up for grabs" by the government. As applied to samples
of biological material, several factors affect this determination. These
include (1) the extent to which the material is displayed to the public, (2)
the extent of the bodily invasion caused by the sampling procedure, and
(3) the nature of the information that can be extracted from the sample.
We now consider these in turn.
2. Public Exposure and Knowledge
Public exposure of a bodily characteristic is highly significant in
determining whether forcing the individual to reveal that characteristic to
the government is a Fourth Amendment search. In Katz, the notion of
75 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
76 Id. at 351.
77 Id. at 352.
78 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 361.
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public exposure was pivotal.80 The later case of United States v. Dion-
isio81 also turns on this consideration. In Dionisio, federal agents had
obtained a recording of a conversation showing illegal gambling opera-
tions. A grand jury ordered twenty people to read the transcript of the
conversation aloud so that agents could record their voices. When Dion-
isio refused, the government obtained a court order compelling him to
furnish the voice sample. Dionisio persisted, arguing that the order vio-
lated his rights to be free from self-incrimination and unreasonable
searches and seizures. The district court held him in civil contempt and
ordered him to be imprisoned until he complied or until the grand jury
expired. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It re-
jected the self-incrimination claim, but concluded that to force Dionisio
to give a voice sample without having probable cause to believe that his
voice was on the recording violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that neither the grand jury
subpoenas nor the recording process constituted a search or seizure. On
historical grounds and because a grand jury subpoena does not itself
physically confine anyone, the Court held that there was no "seizure" of
the person. As for the taking of the voice sample, the Court again con-
cluded that there was no action that fell within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. As the Court explained it:
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone
and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific con-
versation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a
man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is
repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can
have a reasonable expectation that others will not know
the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.82
The exposed-to-the-public principle, however, is ambiguous. In
Dionisio, it was described in terms of features that are casually and con-
stantly observed in public. 83 As to these characteristics, the approach
80 See id. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
81 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
82 Id. at 14.
83 Id. The opinion quoted with approval the observation in United States v. Doe
(Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972), that:
There is no basis for constructing a wall of privacy against the grand jury which does
not exist in casual contacts with strangers. Hence no intrusion into an individual's
privacy results from compelled execution of handwriting or voice exemplars; noth-
ing is being exposed to the grand jury that has not previously been exposed to the
public at large.
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can be summarized as a public-knowledge rather than a mere public-
exposure standard, and in this form it is relatively unproblematic. If the
information about the person's body that the state seeks is known to peo-
ple in the course of everyday life, and if authorities have secured the
individual's presence consistently with the Fourth Amendment, then
compelling the person to expose that information is not a further search
or seizure.
But what about features that are less widely known or not known at
all by casual observers? Courts have extended the notion of "exposed to
the public" well beyond the range of that which is constantly exposed
and easily observed. For example, fingerprints are deposited in public
places, but their detailed structure is not common knowledge. Neverthe-
less, some courts have used the public-exposure principle to justify ex-
cluding compulsory fingerprinting from Fourth Amendment
constraints. 84 In Palmer v. State,85 for instance, the Indiana Supreme
Court reasoned that the warrantless acquisition of defendant's finger-
prints during his trial did not constitute a seizure forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment because "fingerprints are an identifying factor readily avail-
able to the world at large."' 86 Other courts, citing Dionisio, have held that
shining an ultraviolet lamp on an arrestee's skin to expose chemicals
transferred from stolen money is not a search because the flourescent
84 In Dionisio itself, the Court observed that fingerprinting "involves none of the probing
into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." 410 U.S.
at 15 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)). However, Davis did not hold
that fingerprinting was not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the Davis Court sug-
gested in dictum that "[i]t is arguable, however, that, because of the unique nature of the
fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found
to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the tradi-
tional sense." 394 U.S. at 727. Even so, the implication is that the detention to take finger-
prints is a seizure of the person, but "the fingerprinting process itself' is not a search.
Likewise, in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), a plurality implied that scraping
paint from the exterior of a suspect's car and examining it in the laboratory did not rise to the
level of a search. Id. at 591-92 ("With the 'search' limited to the examination of the tire on
the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public
parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed. Stated simply,
the invasion of privacy, 'if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.' ") (plurality
opinion, footnote and citation omitted). But see id. at 592 ("Under circumstances such as
these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not
unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.") (emphasis added).
85 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997).
86 See also State v. Inman, 301 A.2d 348, 355-56 (Me. 1973) ("By the very reason of
their nature it cannot be considered that there is a constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy as to the characteristics of the fingerprint pattern of one validly in police custody any
more than it can be said there is a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy as to any
other outward physical characteristic of one whose person has been validly seized."); Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 381 n.8 (N.J. 1995) ("because plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his fingerprints, photograph or matters of public record, the requirement to provide
such information as part of the registration process [for convicted sex offenders] does not
constitute a search").
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material "may be compared to a physical characteristic, such as a finger-
print or one's voice, which 'is constantly exposed to the public."' 87
Likewise, it might be argued that DNA is constantly exposed to the
public. Many people shed hairs, cough or sneeze, expectorate, and even
leave fingerprints that can contain cells. At best, however, the fact of
such exposure is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the Fourth
Amendment applies. Dionisio and cases extending it involve no intru-
sion into or touching of private areas of the body 88 and no discovery of
information about the individual beyond the identifying characteristics.
Accordingly, even if one takes the dubious position that DNA is con-
stantly exposed to the public in a meaningful way, we must consider
whether these additional factors create a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
3. Invasion of the Body
An inspection or extraction that penetrates the body or enters its
cavities usually is regarded as infringing a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy and hence falling within the zone of the Fourth Amendment. DNA
can be extracted from many sources, including white blood cells, buccal
cells inside the cheek, saliva, and (probably) skin scrapings. 89 As ex-
plained below, the manner of extraction and the site of the materials ex-
tracted indicate that the former two procedures are searches, but these
factors are not dispositive of how the latter two should be treated.
a. Blood Samples
Removing blood from the circulatory system invades bodily integ-
rity, and as such, constitutes a search. The leading case is Schmerber v.
California,90 which involved taking blood from a man being treated in a
hospital for injuries received in an automobile accident.91 The Supreme
87 State v. Holzapfel, 748 P.2d 953 (Mont. 1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 314
A.2d 27, 30-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973). See also United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842,
845 (6th Cir. 1968) ("We do not regard the examination of appellant's hands under the ultravi-
olet light as a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). A minority of jurisdic-
tions reject this view. See, e.g., People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1986).
88 Cf. McClain v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1980) (penile emission sample to test for
gonorrhea is a search subject to Fourth Amendment).
89 DNA also can be extracted from hair samples that include cells from the roots. Courts
are divided on the question of whether taking a hair sample rises to the level of a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure. See, e.g., United States v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1456-57
(11 th Cir.1986); United States v. Anderson, 739 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1984). In In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1982), a divided panel held that be-
cause hair was visible to the public, Dionisio governed as to removing hairs by cutting, but
noted that extracting the portion below the skin might make the result in Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291 (1973) (see infra text accompanying notes 94-97) applicable.
90 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
91 See supra Part I.
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Court held that the warrantless seizure of the blood at the direction of the
police met the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, and it de-
scribed the applicability of that amendment in no uncertain terms:
It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent
does not argue, that the administration of the blood test
in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly constitute
searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon
seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning of that
Amendment. 92
Schmerber was decided in 1966, however; today, it is possible to
withdraw blood from a fingertip with a device that leaves almost no trace
and produces virtually no sensation. This advance in technology makes
blood sampling less disturbing than using a hypodermic needle and syr-
inge or even pricking a fingertip and squeezing, but it does not overcome
the fact that tissue in a portion of the body that is not voluntarily exposed
to the world is being extracted. Consequently, even if blood could be
"teleported" from the inside of the body to an external container, the
"person" would be searched.
b. Buccal Swabs and Oral Sampling
Swabbing the inside of the cheek can provide cells for DNA analy-
sis, as can other devices placed inside the mouth. 93 These procedures are
less invasive than removing blood by conventional means, but they too
exceed an inspection of the surface of the body presented to the public at
large. Consequently, buccal swabbing and the like should trigger Fourth
Amendment protection. This conclusion seems confirmed by Cupp v.
Murphy.94 In Cupp, the defendant was suspected of strangling his wife.
Police took fingernail scrapings from him over his objections. The scrap-
ings contained "traces of skin and blood cells, and fabric from the vic-
tim's nightgown," 95 and defendant was convicted of murder. The case
92 Id. at 767.
93 An oral sampling device that has proved effective for HIV screening consists of a
specially treated pad that is placed between the lower cheek and the gum for two minutes. This
pad is designed to collect oral mucosal transudate rather than saliva. The collection pad, at-
tached to a plastic handle, is then placed in a vial of preservative, and the fluid extracted for
later analysis. See Update on OraSure: A New HIV Antibody Test, at http://webl.tch.harvard.
edu/adolescent/happens/newsletter/volume3/number2/article8.html (visited Mar. 8, 2000).
The device can be used for forensic DNA testing. Moses S. Schanfield et al., Abstract, A New
Oral Sampling Device for the Collection of Human DNA, Ninth Annual Symposium on
Human Identification (1998), available at http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp9
proc/abstracts.html (visited Mar. 8, 2000); Product Information, at http://www.orasure.com/
applications.htm (visited Mar. 8, 2000).
94 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
95 Id. at 292.
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came to Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
Court reasoned that the removal of the sample was a search:
Unlike the fingerprinting in Davis, the voice exemplar
obtained in United States v. Dionisio, . . . or the hand-
writing exemplar obtained in United States v. Mara,96
the search of the respondent's fingernails went beyond
mere 'physical characteristics ... constantly exposed to
the public,' . . . and constituted the type of 'severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security'
that is subject to constitutional scrutiny. 97
If scraping or cutting a fingernail to remove dried blood or other debris is
a search, then so is scraping the inside of a cheek.
c. Saliva Samples
Saliva sampling resembles the voice sample found to lie outside the
zone of the Fourth Amendment in Dionisio. A voice sample travels from
the larynx to locations outside the body - nothing is inserted into the
body or a body cavity to extract the sound. Likewise, a saliva sample
can be acquired without any intrusion. However, the situation differs
from Dionisio in that saliva, unlike voice, is not routinely presented to
the public.
Cases dealing with breath sampling seem to blur these considera-
tions together. The Supreme Court spoke to the classification of breath
sampling in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.9" In that
case, the Federal Railroad Administration had promulgated regulations
that mandated blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain
train accidents and that authorized railroads to administer breath and
urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules. Some provi-
sions authorized breath and urine tests on a "reasonable suspicion" of
drug or alcohol impairment, but others did not require any showing of
individualized suspicion. Railway employees alleged that this system vi-
olated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit invalidated the regulations, holding that the drug-testing
required reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court reversed, but it did not dispute that taking
breath samples is a search. To the contrary, the Court apparently per-
ceived no distinction between taking blood by puncturing a blood vessel
and having a person expel air from the mouth. The majority wrote as
follows:
96 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
97 Id. at 295.
98 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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We have long recognized that a 'compelled in-
trusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alco-
hol content' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment
search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767-768 (1966). See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
760 (1985).[ 99] In light of our society's concern for the
security of one's person, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968),[100] it is obvious that this physical in-
trusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample
to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the
tested employee's privacy interests. Cf. Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-325 (1987). Much the same is
true of the breath-testing procedures .... Subjecting a
person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires
the production of alveolar or 'deep lung' breath for
chemical analysis, . . . implicates similar concerns about
bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we con-
sidered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search
Apparently, the location of the air - in the alveoli
rather than innocuous method of collecting it, was cru-
cial to the Skinner Court.101
This single-minded focus on location leads one to ask whether ma-
terial from the mouth rather than the lungs should be treated any differ-
ently.102 It is difficult to see why, but the cursory analysis in Skinner
99 Winston held that a court-approved removal of a bullet lodged just below the skin of a
suspect done under a local anesthetic was an unreasonable search, given the availability of
other evidence against the suspect and conflicting medical testimony on the risks of the
operation.
100 Terry held the Fourth Amendment applicable to "stop and frisks." Balancing the ex-
tent of the invasion against the value to law enforcement, however, the court held that investi-
gative stops and "pat-downs" merely required "reasonable suspicion"; neither a warrant nor
probable cause was necessary.
101 489 U.S. at 616-17 (some citations omitted).
102 Technically, Skinner leaves open the question whether taking air from the mouth in-
stead of the alveoli would be sufficiently less intrusive to avoid the "search" classification.
After all, that air is, in some sense, more exposed to the outside world than the "deep lung" air
that Skinner protects. The tenuousness of such distinctions points up the limitations of Skin-
ner's emphasis on location. The question of what investigations of the body or its contents
should be considered a search involves a richer set of considerations, some of which are dis-
cussed at other points in Skinner.
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leaves open the argument that saliva sampling is not a search because it
involves no penetration of the body or its cavities. 0 3
d. Skin Scrapings
Collecting DNA from exfoliating epidermal cells would be even
less invasive than saliva sampling. These cells are on the outside of the
body, where they are "visible" to the world in much the same sense that
fingerprints are exposed to the world. If an adequate number could be
obtained by a procedure that is no more disturbing than fingerprinting,
then both the site from which they are taken and the method of collection
would suggest that this form of DNA sampling is not a search.
In sum, although taking blood or buccal cells is likely to be consid-
ered a search subject to the Fourth Amendment because of the method of
extraction and location of the cells, it is possible that taking saliva or
epidermal cells will not be considered a search on the basis of these fac-
tors alone. However, the lines being drawn in the cases on bodily intru-
sions or inspections seem rather faint, and the logic behind them gives
too much weight to what is technically but not functionally exposed to
the public. 10 4 The better view is that all the forms of DNA sampling
103 Most lower courts have held that compelling a person to produce a saliva sample is a
search. See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Henry v. Ryan,
775 F. Supp. 247, 253 (N.D. Il1. 1991); State v. Ostroski, 518 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1986); State v.
Reeves, 671 P.2d 553 (Kan. 1983). But see People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1994) (although the state conceded that taking and analyzing saliva is a search, "the level
of intrusion necessary to obtain a saliva sample would on its face appear lower than that
required for extracting blood"); State v. Zuniga, 357 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1987) (taking of saliva
is unintrusive and therefore not a search).
104 One might have hoped that the Supreme Court's latest encounter with defining a
"search" in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (2001), would have clarified the viability of
the "public exposure" theory. In Kyllo, a federal agent used an infrared detector to find that
"the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to
the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex." Id. at
2041. "Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magis-
trate judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of [Kyllo's] home, and the agents found an
indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants." Id. Before trial, Kyllo moved to
suppress the evidence on the ground that the thermal imaging required a warrant. When the
motion was denied, he entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ultimately affirmed, reasoning that defendant had neither a subjective nor an objec-
tively reasonable expectation that "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall" would
go unobserved. Id. In other words, according to the Court of Appeals, there was no "search."
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed. At first blush, this reversal seems to under-
mine the view that inspecting materials on the surface of the body is not a search. After all, if
the use of an instrument to capture infrared rays coming from the surface of a house is a
search, it might seem that so is the use an instrument to capture and analyze DNA on the
surface of the body. However, the rationale of Kyllo is quite limited. Justice Scalia's opinion
for a majority of five*Justices looks to the historically recognized zone of privacy in which
government surveillance is prohibited. Apparently assuming that Eighteenth Century consta-
bles would have had to enter the house to detect heat sources - a trespass that is the very
paradigm of a search - the majority announced that the infrared scan also was a search. As
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considered here should be denominated searches for the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this conclusion is fortified by consid-
eration of a third factor - the nature of the information derived from the
cells.
4. Nature of the Information
Thus far, we have focused on the extent to which the material to be
collected is exposed to the public and the manner in which it is collected.
The final consideration in determining whether removal or inspection of
bodily material constitutes a search is the nature of the information that
can be derived from it. In bringing this factor to the foreground, Skinner
makes a useful contribution. The majority opinion recognizes that
"[u]nlike the blood-testing procedure at issue in Schmerber, the proce-
dures prescribed by the ... regulations for collecting and testing urine
samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into the body."10 5 Nonetheless,
the opinion concludes that urine sampling followed by urinalysis is a
search for the following reasons:
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of
urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he
or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be
disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be
tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural
monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates pri-
vacy interests.10
6
the Court put it, "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the inte-
rior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology
in question is not in general public use." Id. at 2043. In other words, Kyllo establishes no
more than that the use of technology that is functionally equivalent to trespassing into a home
to acquire information is a search. This result, the Court suggested, was necessary for "the
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted." Id. To hold otherwise, the majority insisted, would "permit police
technology to erode the privacy [originally] guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In contrast, the Fourth Amendment's protections against searches (as opposed to seizures)
of the person lack "roots deep in the common law ..... Id. As the Schmerber Court ob-
served, in "dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences
with property relationships or private papers - 'houses, papers, and effects' - we write on a
clean slate." 384 U.S. at 767-78. Therefore, Kyllo's functional equivalence test does not
dictate the conclusion that it is a "search" to take from the surface of a person's skin cells that
are constantly being shed and to analyze the DNA they contain. Unlike infrared scanning that,
in effect, places the police in the interior of a house, DNA sampling and analysis is not func-
tionally equivalent to any Eighteenth Century practice proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.
105 489 U.S. at 617.
106 Id.
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The concern with "private medical facts" arises with any samples
that can be subjected to DNA analysis. Arguably, Skinner is distinguish-
able in that urinalysis involves both the possible revelation of private
information and interference with what might be called, for want of a
better phrase, "excretory privacy." DNA sampling is closer to voice
sampling in that it can be done noninvasively, but it is closer to urinalysis
in that subsequent biochemical testing can reveal "private medical facts."
To this extent, it cannot be said that DNA sampling, like the fingerprint-
ing in Davis, "involves none of the probing into an individual's private
life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search."107 Certain parts
of one's genome - those related to otherwise nonobvious disease states
or behavioral characteristics - are as much, if not more, a part of "an
individual's private life" as are the hormones or other chemicals found in
one's urine.
Perhaps the conclusion that DNA sampling is a search because of
the nature of the information in the sample could be avoided by a proce-
dure that made it virtually impossible to extract sensitive information. If
the DNA is obtained in a noninvasive manner and if information related
to identification and nothing else could be obtained from it, the analogy
to fingerprinting would be complete. Suppose, for instance, that police
were equipped with miniaturized DNA chips that could probe only non-
functional STR loci and that would destroy the DNA once it has been
analyzed and the alleles recorded. This system might not rise to the level
of a search. As currently practiced, however, DNA sampling should be
considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 0 8
This conclusion does not imply that DNA sampling is impermissi-
ble - only that it must be subjected to serious Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis. As the Skinner Court observed, "[t]o hold that the Fourth
Amendment is applicable to the . . . testing . . . is only to begin the
inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions."' 1 9 It is time to
articulate these standards for ascertaining the "reasonableness" of
searches and to apply them to DNA sampling upon arrest.
107 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
108 The lower courts invariably deem blood sampling for DNA analysis to constitute a
search or seizure, but their reasoning often is cursory. They rarely consider the nature of the
extraction or the informational-privacy aspect of the subsequent analysis. But see People v.
Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) ("conducting additional analysis on the
sample further implicates Fourth Amendment interests").
109 489 U.S. at 618-19.
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B. THE REASONABLENESS OF DNA SAMPLING UPON ARREST
1. The Framework for Analysis: Categorizing versus Balancing
The reasonableness of a search can depend on many factors: the
presence of a warrant, or, in the absence of a warrant, the feasibility or
value of securing one; the extent and nature of the invasion of privacy;
the purpose of the search; and the likelihood that it will achieve its goal.
In theory, courts could inquire into the totality of the circumstances in
each case."Il 0 In practice, however, the courts usually determine reasona-
bleness by invoking a general rule that searches require warrants,II' then
looking through a pragmatic collection of categorical exceptions to this
stringent demand. " 2 For instance, in Cupp v. Murphy,113 the nail scrap-
ing case, the Court held that the search was reasonable, but only because
it fell into a previously accepted category of warrantless searches.
Namely, the search was "incident to a valid arrest"' 1 4 in the sense that
110 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) ("The test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of per-
sonal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion,
the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it
is conducted. E.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-31 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348-59 (1967); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).").
111 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (asserting that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle
that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or mag-
istrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions,"' quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted), and citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Vale
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); and Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)). The foundation for the general rule is less than clear.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures, while the
second clause requires that warrants be based on probable cause and meet certain other re-
quirements. But the amendment is silent on how the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant
Clause interact, and the historical record does not suggest that the former encompasses the
latter. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997).
112 At times, the Court has articulated a different vision of the amendment in which the
Warrant Clause simply states the elements of a valid warrant (probable cause, particularity,
and oath), should the state decide to seek one. Under this view, the absence of a warrant is
merely one factor among many to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a search. As
the Court stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which upheld warrantless, investigatory
"stop-and-frisks" on less than probable cause, "the central inquiry [is] the reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id.
at 19. This view of the amendment is developed more fully in AMAR, supra note 111, at 1-45.
113 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
114 Id. at 295 ("We believe this search was constitutionally permissible under the princi-
ples of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. Chimel stands in a long line of cases recognizing
an exception to the warrant requirement when a search is incident to a valid arrest.").
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the police needed to act immediately to preserve the sample. 115 There
was probable cause, and the exigent circumstances justified the police in
acting before seeking a warrant. Rules like these reflect, to varying de-
grees of accuracy, a balancing of the broad considerations listed above.
Applying these rules to collecting and storing DNA information on
arrestees suggests that a highly circumscribed system of sampling and
typing would be constitutionally acceptable. The constitutional analysis
must attend to the following possible objections to DNA databanking: (a)
there is no warrant and no probable cause (let alone reasonable suspi-
cion) that the search will produce evidence of the offense for which the
arrest is made; and (b) the sampling infringes bodily integrity and infor-
mational privacy. In several other situations where these objections have
been raised, however, the Supreme Court has held that the government
could undertake searches or seizures without a warrant and without indi-
vidualized suspicion. 1 6 If DNA databanking falls into one of the cate-
gories that these cases have established, it satisfies the Fourth
Amendment. If it does not, we must ask whether a new exception should
be created-an inquiry that requires balancing the seriousness of the in-
vasion of privacy against the governmental interests in the search.' 1 7
This approach of defining and applying categorical exceptions can
be contrasted to case-by-case balancing. In recent years, the Court,
speaking through Justice Scalia, has interpreted the Fourth Amendment
as requiring ad hoc balancing for searches as to which no clear historical
precedent exists.1 18 In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 119 a case
upholding mandatory random drug-testing of high school athletes, Jus-
tice Scalia declared that:
At least in a case such as this, where there was no
clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type
of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision
was enacted, whether a particular search meets the rea-
115 Before the police intervened, defendant had placed his hands behind his back, then
into his pockets, and a metallic sound, such as keys or change rattling, was heard. "The ratio-
nale of Chimel, in these circumstances, justified the police in subjecting him to the very lim-
ited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his
fingernails." Id. at 296. (Taking an arrestee's DNA cannot be justified on the basis of the
"incident to arrest" exception. This well established exception permits warrantless searches
tailored to protecting the arresting officers from attack or potential evidence from destruction.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). It does not justify routine searches unrelated to
the offense for which the arrest is made.)
116 See infra Part IV.B.3.
117 See infra Part IV.B.4.
118 For criticism of Justice Scalia's theory of "constitutionalized common law," see David
A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1808
(2000).
119 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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sonableness standard "is judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."120
As applied to DNA databanking, the choice between categorical
analysis and direct balancing does not seem crucial. 12 1 It is open to the
courts to create new exceptions, and the same factors that operate in di-
rect balancing will come into play. It will suffice to consider whether
DNA databanking fits the established categories and whether the case for
a new category is strong.
2. The "True Identity" Exception
The courts have long recognized the importance of accurately iden-
tifying individuals who are arrested. One century ago, in State ex rel.
Bruns v. Clausmeier,12 2 an arrestee sought damages from a sheriff for
taking plaintiff's picture and including it in the local "Rogues' Gallery."
The Indiana Supreme Court held that the sheriff was acting within his
lawful authority:
It would seem, therefore, if, in the discretion of the sher-
iff, he should deem it necessary to the safe-keeping of a
prisoner and to prevent his escape, or to enable him the
more readily to retake the prisoner if he should escape,
to take his photograph, and a measurement of his height,
and ascertain his weight, name, residence, place of birth,
120 Id. at 652-53 (citing Skinner, at 619; footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
Similar language appears in Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999):
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under
the common law when the Amendment was framed. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Where
that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under tradi-
tional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. See, e.g., Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653 (1995).
Justice Breyer preferred to place less emphasis on history, commenting that "I join the Court's
opinion with the understanding that history is meant to inform, but not automatically to deter-
mine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question." Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1304 (concurring
opinion).
121 But see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 26, 126 (2000) (suggesting that a universal DNA database would be permissible under a
reasonableness inquiry "as defined by the values of the rest of the Constitution" but that "it is
far from clear that current doctrine would allow this scheme, because it contemplates intru-
sions for criminal law-enforcement purposes in the absence of ... individualized suspicion...
a category of search that doctrine strongly disfavors").
122 57 N.E. 541 (Ind. 1900).
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occupation, and the color of his eyes, hair, and beard, as
was done in this case, he could lawfully do So. 1 2 3
In 1932, in United States v. Kelly, 124 a distinguished panel of the
Second Circuit,12 5 dismissed a petition alleging that federal agents vio-
lated the Constitution in taking the fingerprints of a man arrested for
selling a quart of gin. Judge Augustus Hand observed that fingerprinting
had become "a method of identifying persons charged with crime [that
is] widely known and frequently practiced both in jurisdictions where
there are statutory provisions regulating it and where it has no sanction
other than the common law.' 26 The court allowed that "[a]ny restraint
of the person may be burdensome,"'' 27 but reasoned that:
Such means for the identification of prisoners so
that they may be apprehended in the event of escape, so
that second offenders may be detected for purposes of
proper sentence where conviction is had, and so that the
government may be able to ascertain, as required by...
the National Prohibition Act, whether the defendant has
been previously convicted, are most important adjuncts
of the enforcement of the criminal laws .... The slight
interference with the person involved in finger printing
seems to us one which must be borne in the common
interest. 128
123 Id. at 542.
124 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
125 Id. (The panel consisted of Learned Hand, Thomas Swan, and Augustus Hand).
126 Id. at 70. The Second Circuit summarized the pertinent cases as follows:
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that it was lawful, though before conviction, to
photograph and measure under the Bertillon system a person arrested on a felony
charge. Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 .. . .In Maryland no statute
existed authorizing such means of identification. The Supreme Court of Indiana
reached a similar conclusion in State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57
N.E. 541 . . .and O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N.E. 137 .. .and so did the
Supreme Court of Arkansas in Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 122 S.W. 115. The
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is in accord. Shaffer v. U.S., 24 App.
D.C. 417. The Court of Chancery of New Jersey in Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J.
Eq. 141, 152 A. 17, held only a year ago, and in the absence of a statute, that a
prisoner who had been arrested for possessing papers pertaining to a lottery was
lawfully subjected to photographing, finger printing, and measurement under the
Bertillon system. To the same effect is the opinion of the New York Court of Gen-
eral Sessions in People v. Sallow, 100 Misc.Rep. 447, 165 N.Y.S. 915, and of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in United States v. Cross, 9 Mackey (20
D.C.) at page 382.
Id. at 69.
127 Id. at 68.
128 Id. The court placed little emphasis on the value of fingerprints to prove prior convic-
tions under the National Prohibition Act, writing "[w]e prefer, however, to rest our decision
upon the general right of the authorities charged with the enforcement of the criminal law to
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Indeed, in most jurisdictions escape from arrest is a separate crimi-
nal offense. 129 Once lawfully arrested, a person has an obligation to re-
main in custody until the police complete the necessary administrative
processing, sometimes culminating in pretrial release and sometimes in
pretrial incarceration. Making a record of identifying characteristics of
every arrestee facilitates the enforcement of the statutes criminalizing es-
cape from arrest.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has yet to bestow its formal
blessing on routine fingerprinting or other identification procedures on
arrest, it has intimated that inquiries that merely identify arrestees are
valid, 130 and today most courts take the propriety of fingerprinting ar-
restees for granted. 13 1 The procedure is a kind of inventory search, pro-
viding an unequivocal record of just who has been arrested, that is
considered appropriate when the state takes an individual into custody.'
32
Of course, recording biometric data that help establish the identity
of those charged with crimes could serve another function. Once the
data have been justifiably obtained as part of the "inventory" of the ar-
rested individual, they might be used to solve crimes unrelated to the one
for which the arrest was made, on the ground that the further use does
not amount to an independent invasion of privacy. 133 For example, "mug
shots" can be shown to a victim of a robbery in the hope that the victim
will be able to identify the perpetrator or to exclude innocent suspects. 134
Some courts have turned this investigative practice into a neologistic ra-
employ finger printing as an appropriate means to identify criminals and detect crime." Id. at
70.
129 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-33 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.6.
130 See Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (plurality opinion offering the fact
that "inspection of an arrestee's personal property may assist the police in ascertaining or
verifying his identity" as one ground for allowing a warrantless, inventory search of the shoul-
der bag of an incarcerated arrestee); cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (plurality
opinion treating procedures to identify an arrestee as exempt from the strictures of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), discussed supra note 39).
131 E.g., Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) ("Taking of fin-
gerprints [prior to bail] is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional
rights."); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("[I]t is elementary that a
person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing ... and fingerprinting
... as part of routine identification processes.").
132 For cases approving of inventory searches of possessions or automobiles following an
arrest, see, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976).
133 The general principle, reflected in a variety of Fourth Amendment cases, is that evi-
dence legitimately acquired for one purpose can used for another purpose, at least if the addi-
tional use entails no further search or seizure of the person. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra
note 1, at 418 n.24 (2001). Under this principle, once the authorities have acquired a suspect's
genotype legally, they are permitted to compare it to genotypes from unrelated, unsolved
crime-scene stains. Id. at 418 n.23 (collecting cases).
134 Of course, acquiring pictures of lawfully detained individuals also is permissible under
the theory that ordinary photography is not a search or seizure. Cf. United States v. Dionisio,
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tionale for fingerprinting. In Jones v. Murray, 35 the first federal appel-
late case to address the constitutionality of DNA databanking for
convicted offenders, the Fourth Circuit pointed to "universal approbation
of 'booking' procedures that are followed for every suspect arrested for a
felony, whether or not the proof of a particular suspect's crime will in-
volve the use of fingerprint identification."' 136 In articulating "the gov-
ernment's interest in preserving a permanent identification record of
convicted felons,"'137 however, the Jones court lost sight of the original
rationale for fingerprinting and spoke only of "resolving past and future
crimes"'138 in that "[i]t is a well recognized aspect of criminal conduct
that the perpetrator will take unusual steps to conceal not only his con-
duct, but also his identity."' 139 Emphasizing that "[d]isguises used while
committing a crime may be supplemented or replaced by changed names,
and even changed physical features,"' 140 the court concluded that collect-
ing DNA genotypes, like taking fingerprints, is justified to link an of-
fender to a crime.141
These observations of the Jones court may well be correct - the
power of DNA typing to forge links between suspects and criminal activ-
ity cannot be denied. However, this investigatory use of biometric data
is not what underlies the "identification exception." The analysis in
Jones posits a government interest that is distinct from the traditional
justification for recording biometric data. This investigatory interest is
more appropriately analyzed under the "special needs" exception or
under a newly created exception as discussed in the next two sections.
The normal "identification exception" might be better denominated a
"true identity" exception, since it merely relates to the government's
need to know precisely who it has arrested.
Although the "identity exception" seems well established, whether
DNA typing can be subsumed within it is less clear. On the one hand,
fingerprints already provide an unequivocal, and in some respects, a bet-
ter record of personal identity than forensic DNA typing. Monozygotic
410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting
exemplar).
135 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
136 Id. at 306.
137 Id. at 307.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. ("Even a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match that his
DNA might make with a sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime
within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair follicles. The governmental justification for this
form of identification, therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from that traditionally
advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force because of the
potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods.").
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twins can be distinguished by their fingerprints, but not by their ge-
notypes. 4 2 In addition, with current technology, fingerprints can be ob-
tained more easily and more cheaply than DNA profiles. On the other
hand, fingerprint patterns cannot be converted into numerical data that
can be searched as efficiently as DNA data. 143 Also, an arrestee might
be carrying false identification, and searching a database of DNA prints
of individuals with outstanding warrants might reveal that the arrestee is
a fugitive. Unless the Fourth Amendment creates a constitutional
straightjacket that fits but one biometric identifier, the narrow, "true
identity" exception should pertain to DNA genotyping as much as it does
to fingerprinting.
3. The "Special Needs" Exception
A relatively recent and somewhat amorphous category of searches
that do not require a warrant or individualized suspicion goes under the
rubric of "special needs." 1 " As discussed below, these cases involve
searches undertaken for some purpose other than, or in addition to, the
interception of contraband or the discovery of evidence of crime. Usu-
ally, but not always, these searches are not undertaken by the police. The
category is described in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,145 as follows:
While we have often emphasized, and reiterate to-
day, that a search must be supported, as a general matter,
by a warrant issued upon probable cause .... our deci-
sion in Railway Labor Executives reaffirms the long-
standing principle that neither a warrant nor probable
cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspi-
cion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in
every circumstance .... [O]ur cases establish that where
a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special govern-
mental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to deter-
mine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or
142 See C.H. Lin et al., Fingerprint Comparison. I: Similarity of Fingerprints, 27 J. Fo-
RENSIC Sci. 290 (1982).
143 See Eric Scigliano, The Tide of Prints, TECHNOLOGY REV., Jan-Feb. 1999, at 63.
144 For a short summary of federal appellate cases, see Douglas K. Yatter et al., Twenty-
Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 88 GEO. L.J.
912, 985-88 (2000).
145 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
490 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:455
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context. 146
The "special needs" cases began with Camara v. Municipal
Court.14 7 Charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code by
refusing to permit an annual inspection of his residence in an apartment
house, Camara argued that the inspection could not proceed without a
warrant based on probable cause to believe that there was an infraction of
the city's housing code. The Court, however, distinguished between
"typical Fourth Amendment cases" 148 and inspections intended to un-
cover "conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety."' 149 It
rejected the argument that "warrants should issue only when the inspec-
tor possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains
violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being en-
forced."' 50 Instead, the Court held that warrants to search for housing
code violations in entire areas could be issued on the basis of area-wide
standards that do not require a showing of individualized suspicion that
there is a violation at a particular dwelling.' 5'
Later cases have upheld warrantless, suspicionless searches of many
types - administrative inspections in "closely regulated" businesses; 52
stops for questioning or observation at a fixed Border Patrol check-
point' 53 or at a sobriety checkpoint; 54 routine or random blood testing
146 Id. at 665-66 (citations omitted). It should be clear from this excerpt that Von Raab
uses the phrase "beyond the normal need for law enforcement" not to define every circum-
stance in which balancing should be used, but merely to label a set of cases in which balancing
has been used.
147 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
148 Id. at 534.
149 Id. at 535.
150 Id. at 534.
151 See id. at 538 (speaking of "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for con-
ducting an area inspection" - "standards, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multifam-
ily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling").
152 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless search by police of automobile
parts junkyard to find evidence of stolen cars under a state statute regulating automobile dis-
mantlers); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) (warrantless inspection of stone
quarry pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless inspection of the premises of a pawnshop operator who was
federally licensed to sell sporting weapons).
153 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50, 566-67 (1976).
154 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990); cf. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (suggesting in dictum that a roadblock with the purpose of
verifying drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible). But cf City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447, 454 (2000) (striking down a program of stops (of
automobiles) and sniffs (by police dogs) "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing").
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and urinalysis of certain employees1 55 and student athletes' 56 (but not
candidates for public office); 15 7 inspections and seizures for the purpose
of inventorying and preserving an arrestee's possessions; 158 random
"shakedown" searches of prison cells; 159 and even visual anal or vaginal
examinations of pretrial detainees. 60 In each case, the Court referred to
"special needs" to justify a balancing test to ascertain the reasonableness
of the type of search in question. In performing the balancing in all these
cases, the Court considered the importance of the government's interest,
the practicality and value of securing a warrant and requiring individual
suspicion, and the gravity of the privacy invasion. 16 1
Judges have disagreed as to the applicability of the "special needs"
exception to convicted-offender DNA databanking. 162 Determining
155 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
156 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
157 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking down a Georgia statute that de-
manded that every candidate for any of fourteen state offices present a certificate from a state-
approved laboratory reporting that the candidate passed a urinalysis drug test).
158 Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983) ("A so-called inventory search is...
an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration. To determine
whether the search of respondent's shoulder bag was unreasonable we must 'balanc[e] its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.' ") (plurality opinion, citation omitted); United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800, 804 (1974) ("With or without probable cause, the authorities were entitled [at the
stationhouse] not only to search [the arrestee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep
it in official custody.").
159 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
160 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(warrantless search of probationer's home was valid because special needs of the probation
system made a warrant requirement impracticable and justified replacement of standard of
probable cause by "reasonable grounds").
161 Whether the Court has given proper weight to these factors and correctly applied them
in each case is doubtful. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 718 (1987) (dissenting
opinion).
162 Compare Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) ("a reasoned interpretation
of the 'special needs' doctrine supports the constitutionality of the DNA statute"); Shelton v.
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("Although the state's DNA testing
of inmates is ultimately for a law enforcement goal, it seems to fit within the special-needs
analysis the Court has developed for drug testing and searches of probationers' homes, since it
is not undertaken for the investigation of a specific crime."), with Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d
1556, 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1995) (dissenting opinion asserting that "[t]he majority relies on the
traditional law enforcement analysis [to uphold a convicted offender DNA databanking stat-
ute] because there is no basis for asserting such a special need here."); People v. Wealer, 636
N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) ("in the absence of a clearly articulated administrative
justification independent of a law enforcement purpose, we are reluctant to extend the special
needs line of cases to the present statute, which has an ostensible law enforcement purpose.");
Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999) (avoiding special-needs analysis
in favor of a broad identification rationale); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089 (Wash. 1993)
(concurring opinion arguing that "the 'special needs' analysis relied upon by the majority was
not designed for application to searches and seizures in the context of ordinary law enforce-
ment," but that the same balancing should be done under the test for law enforcement searches
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whether the exception applies to DNA searches of either convicts or ar-
restees demands a theory that unifies the variegated "special needs"
cases. Although the Court has only hinted at such a theory, the basic
idea is implicit in the word "special" and its antonym, "normal." The
"normal" situation addressed by the warrant-and-probable-cause clause
of the Fourth Amendment involves two competing sets of interests - the
government's interests in enforcing the criminal law, and the individual's
interests in being free from searches and seizures. To construe the
Fourth Amendment as stating that a judicial warrant supported by proba-
ble cause is an essential feature of reasonableness for traditional searches
or seizures 163 is to read the Amendment as announcing a judgment that
the balance between these two sets of interests tips in favor of the indi-
vidual in this class of cases. Thus, in enforcing the criminal code, the
government cannot rely on the fact that it searched only a small portion
of a suspect's house or that the crime under investigation is especially
heinous to circumvent the warrant requirement. However, when the gov-
ernment has a rationale above and beyond "the normal need for law en-
forcement," one cannot simply assume that the outcome prescribed in the
Amendment applies, for an additional interest lies on the governmental
side of the balance. Therefore, in the "special needs" cases, the Court
undertakes a contemporary balancing of public needs and private inter-
ests to enforce the reasonableness requirement.
This theory of the special-needs exception is less than a diatessaron,
but it explains most of the cases in which the Court has invoked the
exception. 164 An immediate threat to public safety (such as that posed by
drunken drivers 165), to the health or safety of workers, 166 or to another
interest distinct from solving crimes and recovering stolen goods or con-
that are minimally invasive). This disagreement pertains to the rationale, not the result. No
appellate court has struck down a law that compels convicted offenders to submit to DNA
testing for law enforcement databanks and databases.
163 For suggestions that this reading may be unjustified, see, for example, Edmond v.
Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) ("read literally, the text requires only that
searches and seizures be 'reasonable' and confines the requirement of 'probable cause' to
searches or seizures made pursuant to warrant"), aff'd sub nom. City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000); supra note 154.
164 It also harmonizes cases like Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the intrusion
on the individual is less extensive than the traditional search or seizure. When the government
engages in a nontraditional, less intrusive search or seizure, the balance struck in the amend-
ment (as it is conventionally understood) may not apply. As a result, it is open to the courts to
tailor the reasonableness requirement to the practice in question. I pursue this approach infra in
Part IV.B.4.
165 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447, 453 (2000) (describing the roadblocks in Sitz as "clearly aimed at
reducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways").
166 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (unannounced federal inspections of
mines).
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traband 167 (such as maintaining the integrity of the border 168 or supervis-
ing probationers 169) usually motivates the practice that curtails individual
liberty or privacy. 170 Thus, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,171 the
Court declined to apply the special-needs exception to a program in
which police used dogs to sniff for drugs in vehicles pulled over in
groups at fixed roadblocks. Distinguishing sharply between "highway
safety interests and the general interest in crime control,"' 72 the majority
reasoned that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcot-
ics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment." 173 Like-
167 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the concern which lies
behind the randomized or comprehensive systems of inspections or searches that have survived
challenge under the Fourth Amendment is not primarily with catching crooks, but rather with
securing the safety or efficiency of the activity in which the people who are searched are
engaged"), affid sub nom. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000).
168 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
169 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
170 The most glaring exception is New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). There, the
Court upheld warrantless searches by police of junkyards as part of a registration and record-
keeping system instituted to detect trafficking in stolen automobile parts. The majority in-
sisted that automobile junkyards were "a closely regulated business." Id. at 702. It then rea-
soned that because
the owner or operator of commercial premises in a "closely regulated" industry has a
reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which
fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a govern-
ment search ... have lessened application .... [A]s in other situations of "special
need," ... where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the govern-
ment interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a
warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. However, emphasis on the "expectation of privacy" is unfortunate. Under Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), this expectation bears on the initial question of whether a novel
method of gathering information is a Fourth Amendment search, not on whether the govern-
ment can dispense with warrants and individualized showings in conducting a search. Only if
the reduced expectation reflects the fact that the individual interests invaded by the investiga-
tory practice are diminished would there be a reason to consider departing from the balance
struck in the Fourth Amendment for traditional searches. Furthermore, a "weakened" individ-
ual interest does not necessarily correspond to a "heightened" government interest. Thus, the
"regulated industries" cases should be seen as a distinct exception to the warrant requirement
rather than as a subcategory of "special needs" cases.
171 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000).
172 Id. at 453.
173 Id. at 454. Six Justices subscribed to this view. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, which was joined, in part, by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, argues against "a new non-law-enforcement primary purpose test lifted
from a distinct area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the searches of homes and
businesses." Justice Thomas also wrote a two-paragraph dissent signaling that he might be
willing to reach the same result as the majority by overruling the Court's special-needs cases
allowing suspicionless roadblocks in any circumstances. His explanation is terse: "I rather
doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable' a pro-
gram of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing." Id. at 462.
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wise, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,174 the Court invalidated a pro-
gram in which a state university hospital tested urine samples from
pregnant women for cocaine and reported positive results to the police so
that those women would be willing to participate in substance-abuse
counseling in lieu of criminal prosecution. Again, the majority of the
Court emphasized "the relevant primary purpose" - which was said to
be "the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers."' 175
On this understanding of the "special needs" cases, one must ask
whether there are purposes for typing DNA from an offender or an arres-
tee that are distinct from the usual investigative function. One, consid-
ered in the previous section, is the administrative purpose of recording
identifying characteristics in the event that the individual escapes and
disguises his identity. Another, which would apply if the arrestee data
were retained indefinitely, is to assist in identifying missing persons or
victims of disasters. And, there are other reasons that the state might
want to know the true identity of a pretrial detainee - contacting rela-
tives in the event of serious illness, for example. To this extent, the spe-
cial-needs exception comes into play.
Assuming for the moment that special-needs balancing would allow
acquisition and retention of genotypes for these limited purposes, 1 76 the
analysis provides an alternative route to the more traditional "true iden-
tity" exception. If that exception did not already exist, we might have to
invent it, and the special-needs jurisprudence supplies the modern frame-
work for doing so. But do the special-needs cases do anything more than
mark another trail to the historically established "true identity" excep-
tion? Do they permit the state to collect biometric information not
merely to obtain personal identifiers for individuals placed in custody,
but also to solve crimes in which DNA has been left?
It is tempting to argue that they do, on the theory that the state is
free to make subsequent use of information that it has legitimately ob-
tained. 177 After all, if the subsequent use is not a new search or seizure,
then the Fourth Amendment demands no additional warrant or show-
ing. 178 Furthermore, it seems odd to maintain that the balance of inter-
ests permits dispensing with warrants or individualized suspicion when
174 121 S.Ct. 1281 (2001).
175 Id. at 1290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 See infra Part IV.B.4.
177 Some courts have relied on another theory - that because inclusion in the database
deters potential offenders, "its purpose is not for 'normal' law enforcement." State v. Olivas,
856 P.2d 1076, 1085 (Wash. 1993). However, this theory takes the "special" out of "special
needs," for any practice that increases the probability of apprehension deters potential offend-
ers. For instance, better detective work might enhance deterrence, but this fact would not
remove the detective's job from the ambit of "normal law enforcement."
178 For instance, once police, proceeding within the scope of a valid search warrant, learn
that a suspect has a pair of size 12 Bruno Magli shoes in his closet, they may use this fact to tie
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non-law-enforcement interests alone are pursued, but not when both law
enforcement and non-law enforcement interests reinforce each other.
However, under Edmond and Ferguson, the additional-use doctrine
applies more subtly at the level of adopting a multifaceted program. Pre-
sumably, in Edmond, the Indianapolis police could have employed road-
blocks to check for intoxicated drivers. While conducting this check,
they could have brought a drug-sniffing dog near the driver's vehicle;
after all, the use of a dog to detect the odor of narcotics is not a search. 179
Therefore, the dissent argued, "[t]he State's use of a drug-sniffing dog,
according to the Court's holding, annuls what is otherwise plainly consti-
tutional .... ,,180 To which the majority responded: "the constitutional
defect of the program is that its primary purpose is to advance the gen-
eral interest in crime control."' 18 Discerning the primacy of the general
crime-control purpose in Edmond was trivial, for this was the only pur-
pose the city proffered.182
Ferguson is slightly more complex in that the state hospital adopted
a program that relied on the criminal law not to punish women, but to
induce them to comply, with drug abuse programs. Nevertheless, the
state hospital established the cocaine testing program in consultation
with the police department for the express purpose of obtaining evidence
for criminal cases.18 3 Consequently, the Court was able to say that the
sole immediate purpose of the program was to generate evidence against
cocaine users for criminal prosecutions, and a program that has as its
only immediate goal subjecting individuals to the criminal law involves
no "special needs."' 84
the suspect to later crimes in which size 12 Bruno Magli shoeprints are discovered. See supra
text accompanying note 28.
179 Every Justice accepted this proposition. See Edmond, 121 S.Ct. at 453 ("[T]hat of-
ficers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis check-
points does not transform the seizure into a search. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983).") (majority opinion); id. at 460 ("[A] 'sniff test' by a trained narcotics dog is not a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not require physical
intrusion of the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than the contraband
items. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-707 (1983).") (dissenting opinion).
180 Id. at 458 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 456 n.1 (O'Connor, J.).
182 See id. at 457 n.2 ("Because petitioners concede that the primary purpose of the Indi-
anapolis checkpoints is narcotics detection, we need not decide whether the State may estab-
lish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and
a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics. Specifically, we express no view on the ques-
tion whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order
to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.").
183 Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. at 1290-91.
184 The majority wrote that:
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in
question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of
the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to
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Significantly, however, neither Edmond nor Ferguson reaches the
more vexing question of what evidence can be used to infer purpose
when the government contends that its immediate purpose in instituting
an investigative practice is something other than (or in addition to) pure
crime control. 85 The validity of mixed-motive programs will be more
difficult to ascertain.
For example, if a state adopts an identification program that it con-
cedes was instituted for the sole purpose of obtaining a personal identi-
fier to check against trace evidence from crimes, then Edmond and
Ferguson close the door to the special-needs exception. Specifically, it
could be argued that (1) just as it would have been permissible to stop
cars to check for inebriated drivers, it is permissible to acquire and retain
the DNA genotypes of custodial arrestees for the limited, administrative
purpose of securing an unambiguous personal identifier; (2) just as the
use of a dog to sniff out crime is not itself unconstitutional, using the
DNA records to link arrestees to other crimes is constitutional; but (3)
because the program was adopted to implement its second component
rather than the first, it has as its "primary purpose" the "general interest
in crime control." This characterization of the program would preclude
the balancing that might excuse the lack of individualized suspicion for
special-needs searches.
reach that goal. The threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as
a means to an end, but the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to
ensure the use of those means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical.
Id. at 1291 (footnotes omitted).
185 The analysis of purpose in constitutional adjudication is notoriously slippery. If the
government asserts that the purpose of a law is the suppression of ideas, the law is likely to be
invalidated under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)
("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."). But if the legislation recites content-neutral purposes, the
Court will not rely on statements of the actual motivation of the law's supporters to establish
that its primary purpose is to suppress certain speech. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (draft-card burning). On the other hand, when the issue is whether a law may
have been enacted to burden one race, the Court looks to actual purpose regardless of the
official explanation. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218, 231 (1964) ("Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and
opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional."). The same searching inquiry
may be used to decide whether the primary purpose of a law is to advance religion. See, e.g.,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[I]f the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the
law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to advance that interest."). These and other domains in which the Court considers
whether legislation is motivated by an impermissible purpose are catalogued in Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REV. 56 (1997).
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But even if a state does not concede that its biometric identifier
program was adopted to look for matches with crime-scene samples, the
result may be the same. Consider the practice of fingerprinting arrestees,
which began in some jurisdictions before latent fingerprints were used in
solving crimes.1 86 In those jurisdictions, the practice originally served
only the administrative functions for having an unambiguous, permanent,
personal identifier of individuals who have been arrested. The primary
purpose test surely is satisfied, and special-needs balancing is
permissible.
Now suppose that such a jurisdiction adopts the practice of checking
these fingerprints against those lifted from crime scenes. If the neoteric
database-query practice is itself a program, then it must confront Ed-
mond's dictum that "programmatic purposes may be relevant to the va-
lidity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general
scheme without individualized suspicion." 187 The only purpose for
searching a database of crime-scene fingerprints (or for creating a
database of arrestee fingerprints to search against new crime-scene prints
as they emerge) is the "general interest in crime control." Hence, the
new practice cannot be upheld under the special-needs balancing.
But if the new practice is treated as part of an integrated system,
then Edmond and Ferguson appear to ask which function the system as a
whole has as its primary purpose - the administrative one of having an
accurate, permanent record of who has been incarcerated, or the general
crime-control one of solving cases. Neither answer is particularly satis-
fying. One could argue that the crime-control component, which came
as an afterthought, is secondary; but the system as ultimately imple-
mented clearly serves both functions.
Now consider the same system with both components adopted si-
multaneously. The situation seems even more complex, for now we
must guess whether the state would have adopted the administrative re-
cord-keeping component even without the crime-control database-query
component.1 88 Assume that it would have, but that it also would have
adopted the database-query component without the record-keeping com-
ponent. In these circumstances, neither component is primary in the "but
186 Some courts have held or implied that taking fingerprints is not itself a search (so that
only the detention of the person need be justified under the Fourth Amendment). See supra
note 84 and accompanying text. For the purpose of exploring the implications of Edmond for
personal identification systems that are treated as searches, this section assumes that finger-
printing is a search of the person.
187 121 S.Ct. at 456.
188 See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 666, 667 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the inquiry into purpose or motive), aff'd sub nom. City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000).
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for" sense. If actual as opposed to announced motives are decisive, 89
however, the legislative history or other sources might be consulted to
decide which motive predominates.
This effort to describe the "primary purpose" test for identification
systems for arrestees could be prolonged, but it seems clear that there is
no general answer to whether a particular system of DNA identification
that goes beyond administrative record-keeping to encompass general
crime-control features will be eligible for balancing under the special-
needs line of cases. The outcomes of but-for tests and mixed-motive
inquiries inevitably depend on particular circumstances, and there is
room for states intent on including arrestees in their DNA databases to
engage in strategic manipulation.
Fortunately, there is a better alternative to the special-needs excep-
tion. It is a candid effort to create a new exception to the general rule
that a warrant and probable cause (or other individualized suspicion) is
essential to the reasonableness of searches and seizures. A system of
nonintrusive DNA sampling, limited analysis of the DNA, and secure
records of DNA genotypes differs from traditional searches and seizures.
The law should not overlook these differences just because the practice
aids criminal investigations and hence is not classified as a "special
need." The next section therefore considers whether an exception for
acquiring and compiling biological trace information should be created
in response to the value of DNA evidence in enforcing the criminal laws.
4. The Trace Evidence Database Exception
DNA databases help solve crimes, and they help avoid false convic-
tions. That is what has led the federal government to promote convicted
offender databases in the states and to earmark funds for reducing the
backlog of unanalyzed DNA samples from crime-scenes and victims. 190
The difficulties of constitutional inquiries into "primary purpose" not-
withstanding, the stark truth is that DNA typing of arrestees appeals to
some politicians, law enforcement officials, and victims of crimes be-
cause it promises more efficient identification of criminals and more ef-
fective deterrence of crimes. Yet, in an effort to fit DNA databases into
existing categories, the analysis thus far has largely ignored this most
powerful reason for establishing databases. We have seen that the Fourth
Amendment permits the acquisition, for administrative purposes, of
DNA records on individuals placed in custody, but that existing excep-
tions to the warrant requirement may not extend beyond such
recordkeeping.
189 See supra note 162.
190 See supra note 25.
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Nevertheless, the existing exceptions to the warrant requirement are
not ancient specimens of an extinct species frozen in amber. They are
living creations whose structures continue to evolve and whose number
is not fixed. Although new exceptions are not created lightly,19' there
are powerful crime-control reasons for a state to establish DNA
databases for convicted offenders or arrestees, the databases can be struc-
tured to respect most individual privacy interests, they can be adminis-
tered fairly, and they can be accommodated with a specific and limited
exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, it is neither hereti-
cal nor Quixotic to pose the question whether such an exception should
be recognized. The answer turns on the same type of balancing that the
Court performs in special-needs cases. The pivotal factors are the grav-
ity of the privacy invasion, the practicality and value of securing a war-
rant and requiring individual suspicion, and the importance of the
government's interest. 192
The attenuated privacy interest. As discussed in Part IV.A, the
physical intrusion is minimal, especially if the surface of the skin is not
penetrated. Certainly, it is far less offensive than the body cavity
searches of arrestees upheld in Bell v. Wolfish.193 Furthermore, if there is
adequate assurance that genotyping of only "vacuous" loci can take
place, no additional privacy interests are implicated.' 94 Finally, there is
191 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
192 See supra Part IV.B.3.
193 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
194 Indefinite retention of pure biometric data that are legitimately gathered does not in-
fringe any constitutionally recognized privacy interest. For example, states may provide for the
expungement of fingerprints or other information related to an arrest or conviction, but it is not
obvious that the Fourth Amendment necessitates such expungement. Cf Hodge v. Jones, 31
F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that, given the state's interest in maintaining a computerized
database of investigations of child abuse, the constitution does not require the files of parents
who had been investigated and cleared of child abuse charges to be removed from the
database); James M. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rav. 73 (1992) (describing the circumstances under which courts grant expunge-
ment of arrest records under their power to do equity). There is extensive variation in state
legislation providing for expungement or sealing of criminal records. Some statutes provide
for destruction of DNA records; others specify that it shall be retained. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-906 (Michie 1997) ("Any individual who has been charged and arrested for any
criminal offense and the charges are subsequently nolle prossed or dismissed, or the individual
is acquitted at trial is eligible to have all arrest records, petitions, orders, docket sheets, and any
other documents relating to the case expunged ...."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Michie
1998) (arrestee who is found to be "factually innocent" can petition to have law enforcement
agencies seal their records of the arrest for three years from the date of the arrest, and then
destroy their records); CAL PENAL CODE § 299(a) (Michie 1998) (sex offender "whose DNA
profile has been included in the data bank ... shall have his or her information and materials
expunged from the data bank when the underlying conviction or disposition ...has been
reversed and the case dismissed, the defendant has been found factually innocent of the under-
lying offense .... the defendant has been found not guilty, or the defendant has been acquitted
of the underlying offense."); FLA. ST. ANN. § 943.0585(1) (West 1999) ("The court may only
order expunction of a criminal history record pertaining to one arrest or one incident of alleged
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no unjustified detention of the person or entry into the home or other
property. In sum, if the collection and storage of the genetic information
is properly structured, the effect on the security of "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects" is de minimis.195
The point of a warrant. The second consideration in ascertaining
whether a DNA database exception is sound involves two aspects of the
warrant process: the extent to which a judicial warrant would protect
against unwarranted invasions of privacy, and the extent to which the
process would interfere with the attainment of the benefits promised by
the system of searches. As the Court explained in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association:196
An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to
protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a
search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random
or arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures
the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and
that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope
.... A warrant also provides the detached scrutiny of a
criminal activity .... " but "[tihis section does not confer any right to the expunction of any
criminal history record .... ); FLA. ST. ANN. § 943.0585(4) (West 1999) ("Any criminal
history record of a minor or an adult which is ordered expunged by a court of competent
jurisdiction ...must be physically destroyed or obliterated by any criminal justice agency
having custody of such record; except that any criminal history record in the custody of the
department must be retained .... ); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.17 (West 1999) ("Criminal his-
tory data in a computer data storage system shall not include arrest or disposition data or
custody or adjudication data after the person has been acquitted or the charges dismissed
...."); 15 LA. REV. STAT. § 614(A) (1999) ("A person whose DNA record or profile has been
included in the data base or data bank ... may request that his record or profile be removed ...
[if the] arrest... does not result in a conviction"); 15 LA. REV. STAT. § 614(B) (1999) ("The
state police shall remove all records and identifiable information in the data base or data bank
pertaining to the person and destroy all samples from the person upon receipt of a written
request for the removal of the record and a certified court order of expungement .... ); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609A.03 (West 1998) (a convicted offender may file a petition for expungement,
which is "an extraordinary remedy to be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that
it would yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public
and public safety"; the record may be sealed, but "shall not be destroyed or returned," and
"[u]pon issuance of an expungement order related to a charge supported by probable cause, the
DNA samples and DNA records held by the bureau of criminal apprehension shall not be
sealed, returned, or destroyed.").
195 The conditions described in the text make the collection of a DNA sample and crea-
tion and retention of a biometric record from it no more troubling than collecting fingerprints.
The Supreme Court has intimated that the process of fingerprinting constitutes "a much less
serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions."
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969). DNA typing, like fingerprinting, "involves
none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search." Id. Like fingerprinting, DNA analysis "is an inherently more reliable and effective
crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such
abuses as the improper line-up and the 'third degree."' Id.
196 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective deter-
mination whether an intrusion is justified in any given
case .... 197
Because police officers have considerable discretion to make war-
rantless arrests, and subjective factors come into play, some risk of arbi-
trary or bad faith decisionmaking is present with arrest-based DNA
sampling. Nevertheless, if DNA sampling is a standard part of the book-
ing procedure and if the additional invasion of privacy due to genotyping
is negligible, the discretion that exists at the time of an arrest is not sub-
stantially more troublesome than it is in arrests not followed by DNA
sampling.' 98 Indeed, if an officer lacks probable cause to arrest, evi-
dence that results from collecting DNA and finding a match in the
database of DNA from unsolved crimes is subject to exclusion. Further-
more, there are many other avenues open to police who are determined to
obtain a DNA sample from a specific individual.1 99 In general, then, the
risk of pretextual arrests intended solely to secure a suspect's DNA pro-
file is limited.
In short, in a system of routine collection of DNA on arrest, judicial
warrants do not greatly advance privacy interests. But requiring warrants
based on probable cause (or a lesser quantum of proof) relating to of-
fenses other than the one that triggers the arrest would defeat the purpose
of DNA databases. These databases are an intelligence tool rather than a
"one-to-one" investigative device for linking a single, known suspect
with a specific, known offense.
The government interests. To be balanced against the individual in-
terest in the security of the person or informational privacy are the gov-
ernment's interests. As with the degree of the intrusion on personal
privacy, these depend on the nature of the DNA databanking system. In
addition to the administrative reasons to record biometric data that show
a person's true identity,200 DNA sampling upon arrest can help reduce
197 Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979) (invalidating a system of automobile stops that involved the "kind of standardless and
unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it
has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some
extent."). Another concern underlying the warrant requirement is "to prevent hindsight from
coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure." United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
198 A warrant for routine DNA sampling would serve no meaningful purpose. See Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 667 (1989) (because the Customs
Service tests all employees applying for particular positions, it "does not make a discretionary
determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present, [and] there are
simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.' ") (quoting South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
199 See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 1.
200 See supra Part IV.B.3.
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serious crime in two ways. First, if a database of trace evidence DNA
genotypes from unsolved crimes is in place, a new arrestee's genotype
can be compared to those genotypes. This can be called a one-to-many
database query in that one arrestee's DNA record is compared to the
many records in the database of trace evidence. A "hit" could result in
continued pretrial detention, prosecution, and conviction for the unsolved
crime. Second, even if no unsolved-crime database exists, the arrestee's
genotype can be included in a database of DNA records of arrestees. 201
DNA found at a crime scene or on a victim in an unsolved case could be
analyzed and compared to all the potential offender records. This can be
called a many-to-one query in that the many arrestee records are com-
pared to the one trace evidence genotype. A "hit" in the arrestee
database could help solve the new case. This enhancement in crime-
fighting is the major interest that courts have invoked to uphold con-
victed-offender databanking.20 2 As we have just seen, it runs in two di-
rections. An arrestee who commits crimes after being booked might be
linked to those crimes, and an arrestee who has committed other crimes
before being arrested might be linked to those past crimes.
But the very fact that there are convicted-offender databases in
place diminishes the need for arrestee databases. 20 3 Many of the people
who are arrested already have convictions and should be in a convicted-
offender database. Arrestee databanking offers no new information
about these individuals. Of the remaining arrestees without previous
convictions, many will be convicted of the crime for which they were
arrested. Even without arrestee databanking, their genotypes would be
added to the convicted-offender database, albeit at a later time. Of these,
many will not be released pending trial in any event. Of those who are
201 The most useful system would retain the identifying data on all arrestees, even those
not convicted of any crimes. This would produce the largest database of potential offender
DNA records.
202 E.g., Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting "the legitimate
government interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts
by the use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.").
However, in upholding DNA databanking for convicted offenders, many courts also have re-
lied on the notion that a conviction inherently diminishes the strength of the individual's pri-
vacy interest. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Once a person is
convicted of one of the felonies . . . , his identity has become a matter of state interest and he
has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from the
blood sampling.").
203 In addition, the current backlog of samples to be analyzed and incorporated in the
convicted-offender databases indicates that the actual benefit to law enforcement of allowing
DNA sampling from arrestees may be limited, at least in the near future. However, this consid-
eration seems to bear more heavily on the wisdom of such legislation than on its constitution-
ality. If, in principle, arrestee data would be a valuable supplement to (or replacement for)
offender data, the Court probably would not invalidate legislation simply because a state is not
yet prepared to implement the legislation fully.
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released, many will not commit crimes. Consequently, the total impact
of taking DNA from arrestees could be small.
In several "special needs" cases, however, the Court has found the
balance to favor searches that resulted in very few "hits." In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 2°4 the Supreme Court validated the
state's use of a roadblock to discover drunk drivers despite a resulting
arrest rate of only one to 1.5 percent. In Bell v. Wolfish,20 5 the Court
upheld body cavity searches of pretrial detainees despite the fact that
there had been only one instance in which an inmate was discovered
attempting to smuggle contraband. Indeed, in Camara, the fraction of
housing inspections that led to findings of code violations probably was
quite small.
But in these cases, the numbers of hits may be low precisely be-
cause the searches deter the conduct that they target. In National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab,206 the Court noted in dictum that
this point "is well illustrated also by the Federal Government's practice
of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board commercial
airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on luggage, without any
basis for suspecting any particular passenger of an untoward motive." 207
Even though only 42,000 inspections of over 10 billion pieces of luggage
have detected firearms, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen the Govern-
ment's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low inci-
dence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme for
implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a hallmark of
success."
208
The difficulty with applying this reasoning to arrestee DNA
databanking is that it is not obvious that individuals who would other-
wise commit murder, rape, or other crimes for which DNA evidence is
likely to be useful will be deterred by the possibility of having their DNA
analyzed in connection with an arrest for an unrelated offense. Neverthe-
less, it can be argued that knowing that one's DNA is on file could raise
the perceived probability of apprehension and thereby deter some of-
fenses. Even so, if it seems that an arrestee is no more likely than a
randomly selected member of the general public to commit or have com-
mitted offenses for which DNA trace evidence will be found, courts may
be reluctant to conclude that the balance of interests supports DNA sam-
pling.209 If reliable data were to demonstrate that individuals arrested for
204 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
205 441 U.S. at 559 (1979).
206 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
207 Id. at 675 n.3.
208 Id.
209 See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that Oregon's
convicted-offender DNA statute authorizes taking "blood samples not from free persons or
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various offenses tend to commit other offenses for which DNA evidence
frequently is available, then the argument for allowing DNA sampling
upon arrest as a "trace evidence database exception" to the warrant re-
quirement should prevail.2 10
5. The Importance of Safeguards
The lack of a warrant or individualized suspicion does not, ipso
facto, render DNA sampling upon arrest unconstitutional. The "true
identity" exception and the type of balancing that generates the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement can justify some systems of DNA sam-
pling upon arrest. But "some" does not mean "all," and informational
privacy must be respected if DNA sampling is to qualify as a reasonable
search and seizure.2 1 ' As David Korn has written:
[P]rogress in molecular genetics ... and biomedical re-
search... have generated deep social concerns about the
acquisition, protection, and use of genetic information.
That term, freighted with mystique and imperfectly un-
derstood by most of the populace, is generally regarded
with awe and fear: awe because the information is per-
ceived to be intensely personal private, powerful, pedi-
gree-related, and predictive[,] and fear because the
potential misuse of such information can lead to insur-
ance and employment discrimination, disruption of per-
sonal and familiar well-being, and stigmatization. 212
even mere arrestees, but only from certain classes of convicted felons"); State v. Olivas, 856
P.2d 1076, 1089, 1094 (Wash. 1993) (concurring opinion) ("We would be appalled, I hope, if
the State mandated non-consensual blood tests of the public at large for purposes of develop-
ing a comprehensive Washington DNA databank.").
210 Experience with DNA databases in several states and in the United Kingdom, as well
as statistics on recidivism suggest that this condition might hold. See LAWRENCE A. GREEN-
FELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 26 (1997); Richard Willing, States Adding Burglars to DNA
Databases, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1998, at IA; David Coffman, Address at the Fourth Annual
National Conference on the Future of DNA: Implications for the Criminal Justice System,
Albuquerque, N.M., May 3, 1999; Address by David Werrett, supra note 9. A Committee of
the National Academy of Sciences expressed a contrary view that was not supported by any
research at the time and that hindsight reveals was shortsighted See NAT'L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, COMM. ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 120 (1992).
21 1 So must the interest in bodily integrity, but this concern seems easily met. Simple and
painless collection of DNA is technologically and economically feasible, and government offi-
cials concerned with public support and efficient operation of a system of DNA databanking
have ample incentives to use these minimally invasive procedures.
212 David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the Use of Human
Tissue Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 16, 16-17
(Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (footnote omitted).
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Unfortunately, these fears are easily exaggerated 213 and manipu-
lated.214 The notion that our destiny is in our genes is as untenable 215 as
it is popular. 216 Yet, the fact remains that DNA samples could be ana-
lyzed for a number of markers associated with congenital diseases or
susceptibility to other diseases. 217 Although health insurers are not espe-
cially interested in this information and although a small explosion of
state laws ban or restrict its use in insurance and the workplace, 218 the
possibility that the government will allow the samples to fall into the
wrong hands or will misuse them for its own purposes must not be
ignored. 219
213 For example, few documented cases of "genetic discrimination" can be found. See,
e.g., Philip R. Reilly, Genetic Discrimination, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMA-
TION, supra note 212, at 106. The studies that purport to reveal instances of discrimination
employ grossly biased sampling methods and ill-defined questions, and they fail to confirm
allegations of discrimination. Id.
214 Kom, supra note 212, at 27 (observing that the public is "susceptible to being stirred
up by anything containing the iconic words gene or genetic").
215 See, e.g., R.C. Lewontin, The Dream of the Human Genome, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
May 28, 1992, at 31; Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998).
216 For instance, ACLU President and Professor Nadine Strossen announced that the
ACLU opposes DNA databanking because "[w]ho I am, my biological potential, my health
situation, my paternity, my race, all of these things that can be revealed through genetic test-
ing," and "you cannot trust government with your most profound personal secrets." 60 Min-
utes: DNA Data Banks Keep Track of Criminals, Cause Controversy (CBS television
broadcast, Apr. 18, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16209028.
217 E.g., Susanna Annunen, An Allelle of COL9A2 Associated with Intevertebral Disc
Disease, 285 SCIENCE 409 (1999). Genetic markers for behavioral traits or psychiatric condi-
tions are harder to discern. See, e.g., Peter Aldhous, The Promise and Pitfalls of Molecular
Genetics, 257 SCIENCE 164 (1992); John C. Crabbe et al., Genetics of Mouse Behavior: Inter-
actions with Laboratory Environment, 284 SCIENCE 1670 (1999); John R. Kelsoe et al., Re-
evaluation of the Linkage Relationship Between Chromosome lip Loci and the Gene for Bipo-
lar Affective Disorder in the Old Order Amish, 342 NATURE 238 (1989); Charles C. Mann,
Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCIENCE 1686 (1994); George Rice et al., Male Homo-
sexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28, 284 SCIENCE 665 (1999).
Yet, the belief that many behavioral markers exist (or someday will be found) is offered as a
reason to dispose of DNA samples. E.g., Nat'l Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evidence,
Proceedings, Mar. 1, 1999 (statement of Barry Steinhardt), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/nij/dnamtgtrans4/transh.html (visited Sept. 14, 1999) ("[T]here are many who will claim
that there are genetic markers for aggression, for substance abuse, for mental illness, for crimi-
nal tendencies, and even sexual orientation.").
218 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.715; Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr.,
Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetic Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21
(1999); Korn, supra note 212, at 21-22 (concluding that "those efforts have yielded an uncoor-
dinated and often discordant patchwork of uneven scope and effectiveness").
219 In the 1980s, several state police in New York used fingerprints from booking cards to
manufacture "evidence" with which to confront suspects. See John Caher, Judge Orders New
Trial in Murder Case, TIMES UNION (ALBANY), Jan. 8, 1997, at B2; John O'Brien & Todd
Lightly, Corrupt Troopers Showed No Fear, THE POST-STANDARD (SYRACUSE), Feb. 4, 1997,
at A3 (an investigation of 62,000 fingerprint cards from 1983-1992 revealed 34 cases of
planted evidence among one state police troop). Of course, enterprising police officers seek-
ing an individual's DNA can acquire samples from many sources. See, e.g., The Crier Report:
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To pass constitutional muster, a system of DNA databanking should
include effective provisions to ensure the security of the sensitive infor-
mation inherent in DNA samples. Two approaches to security are possi-
ble - "front-loading" and "back-loading." Front-loading seeks to
preserve privacy by curtailing the creation of information.220 In the con-
text of forensic DNA databanking, it confines the government to collect-
ing and retaining the minimum of information that is needed for
identification purposes. A back-loaded system forces the government to
keep the information in its own hands and to use it only as authorized. 221
A heavily front-loaded system would limit authorities to analyzing
genotypes that have no more social significance than other identifying
features such as skin color, eye color, fingerprint patterns, and blood and
tissue types. These genotypes do not expose our "most profound per-
sonal secrets," 222 and they are far less sensitive or revealing than the vast
array of nongenetic information that is the traditional subject of privacy
protection. 223 The most puissant form of front-loading would be the au-
tomatic destruction of the samples once the identifying alleles are re-
corded. The result would be a database of computer-searchable - but
socially trivial-numerically encoded genotypic identifiers. DNA
databanking with personal identifiers would not be practiced, although
anonymized samples might be retained for quality control or research
purposes. 224
A back-loaded system would tolerate DNA databanks, but it would
prevent unauthorized access to and use of the personally identified DNA
samples by locking them up and establishing criminal or other penalties
for unauthorized access or use. Rather than attempting to stop the collec-
tion of information "up front," it strives to curtail the dissemination and
Mandatory DNA Testing (Fox television broadcast, Mar. 11, 1999), available at 1999 WL
18330169 (New York City police obtained DNA from a suspected serial killer and rapist by
removing it from a coffee cup that he had used); Dan Kraut, Baltimore Cop Charged in Bank
Robberies, May 18, 2000, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ao/20000518/cr/baltimore_cop_
charged-inbankrobberies_l.html (visited May 19, 2000) (saliva specimen of suspect "sur-
reptitiously obtained").
220 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 218.
221 In the terminology of Gostin and Hodge, this would be an "information management
approach." Id.
222 See supra note 22.
223 Records of credit card purchases, bank transactions, Internet use, and public library
borrowing, for example, are much more invasive of personal privacy. But see United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (reasoning that subpoenas to a bank for checks and deposit
slips did not intrude "into any area in which [the defendant] had a protected Fourth Amend-
ment interest" because the defendant had voluntarily relinquished these materials to the bank).
224 See, e.g., DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(2) (permitting sam-
ples to be accessed "if personally identifiable information is removed, for a population statis-
tics database, for identification research and protocol development purposes, or for quality
control purposes"); IDAHO CODE § 19-5505(2)(d) (1997) (permitting "[a]nonymous DNA
records [to be] used for research or quality control").
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use of the information. This is the approach currently taken with law
enforcement databanks. 225 It cannot assure that misuse never will occur,
but the level of security is considerably higher than that sometimes sur-
rounding DNA samples in the private sector.
Of course, no system can reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure
to zero. But the Constitution does not require perfection. Cases like
Whalen v. Roe 226 indicate that the Court is unwilling to invalidate even
those databases containing information that is indisputably "personal in
character and potentially embarrassing or harmful"227 merely because of
the unavoidable risk of abuse.228 In Whalen, the Court deemed the com-
bination of (1) a "statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted dis-
closures," 229 (2) physical measures to ensure security, and (3) a history
of operation that had not been marked by breaches of confidentiality,
adequate to satisfy the interest of patients in the privacy of their prescrip-
tions.230 No less should be required of a government databank of DNA
samples. With sufficient safeguards - but not without them-a system
for collecting DNA on arrest, analyzing it for appropriate genotypes, and
storing those data for law enforcement purposes should be constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of rou-
tine DNA sampling of arrestees is complex, and the outcome of the anal-
ysis is debatable. Of all the constitutional guarantees, the Fourth
225 See, e.g., DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c) (establishing a crimi-
nal penalty of up to $100,000 for knowing disclosure of "individually identifiable DNA infor-
mation indexed in a database created or maintained by any Federal law enforcement agency"
or for knowing receipt of "DNA samples or individually identifiable DNA information" in a
federal database"); MD. CODE, Art. 88B, § 12A(n) (misdemeanor penalty of up to $1,000 fine
and three years imprisonment).
226 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
227 Id. at 605.
228 See supra Part III.B. Indeed, according to some commentators, "[ailmost any precau-
tion against unauthorized disclosure seems adequate to allow governmental information-gath-
ering to pass muster." Burk & Hess, supra note 18, at 40.
229 429 U.S. at 605.
230 The Whalen Court examined the system for maintaining the confidentiality of the pre-
scription records in some detail:
The receiving room is surrounded by a locked wire fence and protected by an alarm
system. The computer tapes containing the prescription data are kept in a locked
cabinet. When the tapes are used, the computer is run "off-line," which means that
no terminal outside of the computer room can read or record any information. Pub-
lic disclosure of the identity of patients is expressly prohibited by the statute and by
a Department of Health regulation. Willful violation of these prohibitions is a crime
punishable by up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. At the time of trial there
were 17 Department of Health employees with access to the files; in addition, there
were 24 investigators with authority to investigate cases of overdispensing which
might be identified by the computer.
Id. at 595.
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Amendment casts the longest shadow over proposals to take samples
from all individuals brought into custody. Although some procedures for
obtaining and analyzing the DNA arguably do not even rise to the level
of a search, others clearly do. Even so, for all methods of sampling, there
is a sharply diminished expectation or invasion of privacy as compared
to the traditional search for contraband or instrumentalities of a crime,
and the normal reasons for a warrant and individualized suspicion are
attenuated. Where the primary purpose of DNA sampling upon arrest is
the acquisition of a permanent personal identifier for individuals who are
in custody, the traditional "true identity" exception to the warrant re-
quirement for fingerprinting, photographing, and the like, as well as the
"special needs" line of cases support the collection of the DNA records.
But DNA databases can do much more than discern an individual's
true identity. They can associate individuals with crimes. A database
created and used for general law enforcement purposes fits poorly, if at
all, into the existing mold of Fourth Amendment exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. Nonetheless, a cogent argument can be made for a
new exception to the warrant requirement for the relatively nonintrusive
collection of nonstigmatizing, personally identifying markers that can
generate a list of probable perpetrators of serious crimes. The Reasona-
bleness Clause requires a balancing of the nature and extent of the in-
fringement of the individual's privacy against the value of having a
database of genotypes. With convicted-offender databases, every court
that has undertaken this balancing has concluded that DNA databanking
is reasonable. Yet, the very existence of these offender databases, com-
bined with the routine practice of fingerprinting arrestees, weakens the
case for the constitutionality of compulsory DNA sampling upon arrest.
Which way the balance tips is a close question, but one that should be
resolved in favor of a minimally invasive, highly secure system for DNA
databanking even at the point of arrest.2 31
231 Given the fractious nature of proposals to enlarge DNA databanking, it may be useful
to make explicit an elementary point: not all that is constitutional is advisable. Resources for
enforcing the criminal laws are scarce, and the analysis here does not begin to answer the
question of whether acquiring DNA on arrest has sufficient marginal benefits to make it a wise
investment. In addition, the system will have a disparate impact on racial minorities. Relative
to population size, about five times as many African-Americans as whites are arrested for
crimes of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 107 (Steven R. Donziger ed.,
1996). About three times as many African-Americans as whites are arrested for less serious
crimes, which make up the bulk of arrests. Id. at 107-08. Moreover, the sheer reach of arrest-
based databases should make one pause. From studies of the prevalence of arrest in New York,
California, and Pennsylvania, as well as nationally, it appears that, by the time they turn 30, at
least 25% of males will be included in a database of DNA profiles if DNA is sampled on
arrest. See Donziger, id., at 36 (reporting that "there are least 30 million individuals in the
United States with a criminal record" and that a "conservative" estimate is "that one-fourth of
all men in the United States have a criminal record on file with the police"). The figure is
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likely to be closer to 50%. It will be much higher in areas aggressively patrolled by police,
and it will approach 100% in some African-American neighborhoods. See Jerome G. Miller,
From Social Safety Net to Dragnet: African American Males in the Criminal Justice System,
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 485 (1994) (reviewing studies and surmising that "the percent-
age of nonwhite males [in cities] who could expect to be arrested and at least briefly jailed
would [be] 90%").

